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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Conceptions of property often begin with the proposition that the individual owns 
his or her own self—that “every man has a property in his own person.”2  In the 
consumer contracting context, however, the growth of information technologies that 
permit the collection, processing, copying and dissemination of vast amounts of 
personal information threatens this concept of exclusive ownership and control of the 
self.3  Specifically, producers4 in the information era have the ability to collect 
extraordinarily detailed personal information about individual consumers and then 
use that data to develop a high-definition electronic double—a doppelganger5—of 
those individuals.6  Producers can then use this electronic reflection of a consumer’s 
interests, wants, habits and needs, to invade a consumer’s control over personal 
                                                                
2John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil 
Government (1690), in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 413 (Edwin A. 
Burtt, ed. 1939) (“Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every 
man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself.”); see also 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 54-59 (1995) (arguing in favor of 
self-ownership as fundamental rule for building system of property rights). 
3See Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the 
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1326-32 (1992) 
[hereinafter Schwartz, Data Processing] (noting dangers to individualism and relations 
between individual and state presented by pre-Internet, industrial-age information collection 
and processing technologies).  
4In analyzing bargaining power relations, I have adopted Professor W. David Slawson’s 
definitions of “producer” – a person who produces products, including both goods and 
services, for sale – and “consumer” – a person, including individuals and businesses, who 
buys a product to consume it. See W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES 24 (1996). 
5In German mythology, the doppelganger was an evil spirit that took on the form of an 
individual, the appearance of which usually foretold impending doom for that individual. 
Alternatively, the doppelganger is a literary device used to demonstrate that each individual’s 
“self” actually comprises multiple, schismatic reflections of the same person.  See ANDREW J. 
WEBBER, THE DOPPELGANGER: DOUBLE VISIONS IN GERMAN LITERATURE 1-12 (1996) 
(surveying characteristics of doppelgangers in literature and noting the story of Dr. Jekyll and 
Mr. Hyde as one prominent example of the use of doppelgangers). 
6For a detailed analysis of the development of electronic personae by government and 
private organizations, see generally Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual 
Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (1996). 
Of course, individuals also can use the online environment to recreate their own identities and 
craft online personae that reflect an idealized version of their selves to the outside world. See 
Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Privacy, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 222, 252 (2004) (“Even outside of 
structured forums, a user can adopt a multiplicity of gender, sexual, racial, or other categorical 
identities, invent accompanying personal histories, and engage in an assortment of acts that 
she would probably not perform in real life. [V]irtual space allows individuals to construct 
identities they choose for themselves . . . .”). 
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choices and interests.  The doppelganger identifies the targets most susceptible to 
particular products and pitches, assists the producer in making the sale, and perhaps 
even suggests means of exploiting known cognitive biases that can interfere with 
free and rational choice by the consumer.  And, most importantly, the doppelganger 
is the property of the producer or data miner who created it—individual consumers 
currently have no power to restrict or control others’ uses of these electronic 
manifestations of their selves. 
This propertization of personal information accompanies an increasing 
disconnect between consumer contracts in practice and classical notions of contract 
as consensual, bargained-for agreements.  Contract scholars have been more or less 
obsessed with the non-dickered, adhesive nature of standardized form contracts for 
much of the last century.7  The modern reality of highly sophisticated forms of 
adhesion contract—browse-wrap and click-wrap contracts8–appears to exacerbate 
the lack of assent and take-it-or-leave-it nature of consumer adhesion contracts. As 
some commentators have noted, the fiction of consumer assent to such new forms of 
                                                                
7See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211, 240 (1995) (“The problems raised by the use of form contracts have been a 
major preoccupation of contract law scholars for the past forty years. The primary areas of 
concern have been the enforceability of preprinted terms and the import of preprinted terms in 
determining whether a form sent in response to an offer constitutes an acceptance.”); see also 
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1204-06 (2003); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: 
The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 23-46 
(1984) (analyzing meaning of contract in light of changed social and economic conditions and 
surveying scholarly responses to standard form contracting phenomenon); Todd D. Rakoff, 
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1242-51 (1983) 
(arguing against enforceability of non-salient terms in adhesion contracts); Freidrich Kessler, 
Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 
640 (1943) (“Standard contracts in particular could . . . become effective instruments in the 
hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal 
order of their own making upon a host of vassals.”); cf. Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of 
Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 39 (1917) (criticizing continued reliance on freedom of contract 
principles in light of growing use of adhesion contracts). 
8Browse-wrap contracts comprise attempts by website owners to bind site visitors to the 
website’s “Terms of Service” or “Conditions of Use” by presenting a hyperlink to view such 
terms together with an assertion that use of the website constitutes acceptance of those terms. 
Click-wrap contracts differ in that the user is presented with a screen containing contract terms 
to which he must assent by clicking a hyperlink before he can proceed. See, e.g., James J. 
Tracy, Legal Update, Browse Wrap Agreements: Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 11 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 164, 164-65 (2005) (describing click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts and 
noting that recent cases suggest greater willingness by courts to enforce some browse-wrap 
contracts); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 
1125, 1129 (2000) [hereinafter Radin, Binding Commitment] (describing onerous terms of 
service or conditions of use that commercial websites attempt to impose upon all site visitors); 
Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an 
Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 333-34 (1999) (describing click-wrap 
agreements as requiring “the purchaser to use his or her mouse to ‘click’ on buttons appearing 
on the computer screen, thereby assenting to the terms and conditions”). 
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adhesion contracts is even more absurd than with their paper-based counterpart.9 Just 
as with the relatively crude paper-based contracts, few consumers ever bother to read 
these terms, and the nature of online contracting permits producers to hide their 
boilerplate terms far more effectively than even the finest of fine prints.10 
Consequently, some have suggested contract law should abandon models of contract 
based upon assent in favor of recognizing contract terms as part of the product being 
bought and sold.11  
Taken together, these phenomena appear to suggest that the traditional 
conception of a property interest in the self has become—at least in the consumer 
contracting context—wholly fictional. The consumer no longer exclusively “owns” 
her own self because producers and data miners have access to an electronic 
simulation of that consumer, an evil twin who can often tell them which cognitive, 
emotional, and appetitive buttons to push to manipulate the consumer.12  Similarly, 
producers also know in a general manner how to pressure the consumer to give 
“assent” to the producer’s preferred contract terms by manipulating the transaction 
costs involved in reading, understanding, and seeking alternatives to those contract 
terms.13  To the extent that these qualities represent proxies for the “self” at the basis 
                                                                
9See Radin, Binding Commitment, supra note 8, at 1125 (“Commercial practice has long 
deviated from the traditional picture of minds meeting about terms or autonomous consent.”); 
Goodman, supra note 8, at 319-22 (noting lack of notice to consumer of shrink-wrap or click-
wrap terms and likelihood that consumer fails to read such terms).  
10Browse-wrap contracts, for example, require web surfers to take affirmative steps to seek 
out a set of terms and conditions that they are unlikely to read in the first place. See Radin, 
Binding Commitment, supra note 8, at 1129 (describing, inter alia, www.Disney.com web site 
in which terms of use link appears in small print at bottom of page where most users would 
not likely scroll or bother to click on the link). Professor Radin notes that the Disney.com 
terms of use, despite their relative obscurity on the website, nonetheless purport to condition 
use of the site on a complete waiver of all rights in any intellectual property uploaded to the 
site’s discussion forums and impose a forum selection clause upon all disputes. See id. (noting 
several apparently onerous browse-wrap contracts). 
11See Radin, Binding Commitment, supra note 8, at 1125-26 (suggesting “contract-as-
product” model better describes “much of transactional practice” better than consent-based 
models of contract). 
12See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 39 (1996). 
[Computer] data processing creates a potential for suppressing a capacity for free 
choice.  The more that is known about an individual, the easier it is to force his 
obedience.  Through the use of databanks, the state and private organizations can 
transform themselves into omnipotent parents and the rest of society into helpless 
children. 
Id.; see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (2001) (quoting SCHWARTZ & 
REIDENBERG). 
13See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 466 (2002) (“Internet design companies consult 
traditional marketing gurus, but also cognitive psychologists and anthropologists in an effort 
to maximize the number of site visitors and to induce these visitors to engage in the desired 
responses.”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 216-25 (surveying categories of known 
cognitive biases that limit ability of parties to make fully rational contract decisions, including 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss1/6
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of property, the information age appears to be not only propertizing the consumer’s 
identity and will,14 but also giving property rights in those qualities to producers and 
data harvesters, not the consumer whose personality, desires and choices generated 
that electronic double.15 
This Article argues that the threatening consequences of this commodification 
and propertization of consumers’ electronic selves represent only part of the picture.  
Information era technological developments provide more tools than ever available 
before by which consumers can place boundaries around their right to consent and 
exclude others from that arena.16  Thus, Internet-based contracting allows consumers 
to access a broad range of bargaining power inputs to protect their power to withhold 
consent.17  Instead of an amorphous, indefinable quality of contracting parties, 
bargaining power may now be characterized as a series of discrete inputs that can be 
identified, evaluated, exchanged and owned.18  In essence, bargaining power may be 
treated as property or a commodity that in turn serves as a protection against 
unwanted manifestations of the self through coerced or unwitting exercises of 
consent. 
This analogy of creating property rights in bargaining power and consent is 
intriguing, not because of the potential that these ephemeral concepts are property, 
but rather because it may help refocus the way that we think about bargaining power, 
personal responsibility and the ability of consumers to continue participating in a 
meaningful way with transactions in the information era.  Internet-based contracting 
allows a much more finely-grained picture of the bargaining power of the parties. In 
the classical contract model of two “farmers haggling over the sale of a horse,”19 for 
example, every transaction is a unique occurrence that cannot be replicated.  
Traditional judicial approaches to the phenomenon of bargaining power reflect this 
uniqueness, generally treating consumer bargaining power as an all-or-nothing affair 
                                                           
overoptimism, framing effects, information availability, undersampling available data, 
inability to assess future costs and benefits, and underestimation of risks). 
14Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423-28 (2000) (arguing that strong protections of personal data privacy 
are necessary for the development of autonomous individuals through the exercise of free, 
unmonitored choices). 
15See Andrew McClurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response 
to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 142 (2003) (“Our data selves have 
become commodities, bought and sold like bags of potato chips.”). 
16Cf. Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in 
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 398 (2005) (“The commodity 
metaphor [in the intellectual property and creative works context] creates an abstract ‘fence’ 
around (abstract) informational goods. While we may easily build a fence to keep others off 
our land, we cannot keep others from playing a musical composition hundreds of miles 
away.”). 
17See infra Part III.B.3. 
18See infra Part IV.A. 
19See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1908) (“Why do we find 
a great and learned court in 1908 taking the long step into the past of dealing with the relation 
between employer and employee in railway transportation, as if the parties were individuals – 
as if they were farmers haggling over the sale of a horse?”). 
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measured on the basis of a few crude heuristics such as availability of meaningful 
alternatives, necessity, wealth, gender, education and organizational size.20  
Measurement of the effect of various bargaining power inputs upon the quality of the 
outcome for one or both of the parties under the classical paradigm is impossible. 
Although we cannot understand completely the bargaining power of transacting 
parties in the information era, it is easier to identify the existence of multiple, 
discrete bargaining power inputs and assess their relative value across similar 
transactions.  First, information era contracting is standardized21 to an extent the 
market can commodify many potential bargaining power inputs.  Second, 
information and transaction costs can be reduced to the point where individual 
consumers can identify and access these bargaining power tools and information.22  
Consequently, by treating bargaining power as comprising many different but 
identifiable and discrete components, external observers such as courts, legislatures 
and commentators can craft a more detailed and textured picture of the power 
relationship between the parties than was possible before the information era. 
The propertization analogy is also intriguing for reconceptualizing bargaining 
power and consent.  By treating bargaining power as a fence or wall with which 
consumers guard their power to grant or withhold consent, we create a framework in 
which it is easier to observe that both sides possess bargaining power.  Notably, 
many of the responses to information era contracting have been strongly 
paternalistic23 and often—explicitly or implicitly—characterize the consumer as 
powerless in transactions with producers.24  Although there may be situations in 
which state policing and regulation are appropriate to protect against absolute 
disparities of bargaining power, recognizing the potential for bargaining power on 
the consumer side of the transaction is crucial for maintaining the personal 
responsibility that makes individual access to contract possible.  
                                                                
20See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 
199-223 (2005) (surveying factors used by courts in analyzing power relationship between 
bargaining parties). 
21See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and 
Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1138-46 (2002) [hereinafter Radin, Online 
Standardization] (noting that “the online environment facilitates standardization in various 
ways” at the same time it promotes customization of other aspects of the consumer-producer 
relationship). 
22See Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of 
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (1999) (“Not only is more personal 
information available now than ever before, but it is becoming easier and less expensive to 
obtain access to it. . . . Prices for many services are now at the point where information that 
formerly could be afforded only by businesses is not accessible to individuals.”). 
23But see Hillman & Rachlinksi, supra note 13, at 486-95 (“Although the electronic 
environment is a truly novel advance in the history of consumerism, existing contract law is up 
to the challenge.”). 
24See, e.g., Solove, supra note 12, at 1393 (arguing in favor of privacy law metaphors 
based upon Franz Kafka’s “The Trial” that emphasize “the powerlessness, vulnerability, and 
dehumanization created by the assembly of dossiers of personal information where individuals 
lacking any form of participation in the collection and use of their information”). 
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Part II explores some of the characteristics of consumer contracting in the 
information age and some of the legal responses to the issues of information 
propertization, consumer privacy, and assent that are raised in that context.  In Part 
III, this Article surveys the relationship between consumer bargaining power and the 
ability of individuals to control manifestations of their selves through contract.  In 
contrast to crude contract-based notions of bargaining power, this Part develops a 
model of negotiating strength or weakness based upon the propertization metaphor 
that currently informs much of the intellectual property and privacy literature.  
Finally, Part IV analyzes the ramifications of that propertization metaphor for future 
developments in legal conceptions of bargaining power in the consumer-producer 
relationship. 
II. CONSUMER CONTRACTING IN THE INFORMATION ERA 
A.  Characteristics of Consumer Contracting in the Information Age 
The Internet is a dangerous place for consumers, at least according to many 
commentators.  Amoral producers hawk their wares to unsuspecting and 
unsophisticated e-consumers who innocently enter the dark alleys of electronic 
commerce, lured by the siren call of bright and flashing neon signs promising 
selection, price and convenience.25  Once there, the e-producer wraps an arm around 
the e-consumer’s shoulder in a faux-friendly embrace and appears to recognize her 
by name,26 suggesting some wares for which his data-mining shill has indicated 
she’ll pay top dollar.27  
As she shops, the producer keeps track of everywhere she looks28 and gently asks 
for her most personal information29–he’ll make some good money selling this 
                                                                
25See, e.g., Anil M. Pandya, B2C Failures: Toward an Innovation Theory Framework, J. 
ELECT. COMM. IN ORG., Apr.-June 2005, at 73 (showing that e-commerce “reduces search 
costs . . . [and] is convenient, quick, easily accessible, and less expensive”); Rajiv Kohli et al., 
Understanding Determinants of Online Customer Satisfaction: A Decision Process 
Perspective, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 21 no. 1., Summer 2004, at 115, 120 (noting that 
consumers achieve significant cost savings from online retail through both lower prices overall 
and savings “by purchasing products with the precise features they need, thereby not having to 
pay for features they do not need”).  
26See Rajiv Dewan, Bing Jin & Abraham Seidmann, Adoption of Internet-Based Product 
Customization and Pricing Strategies, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 17 no. 2, Fall 2000, at 9, 23 
(“The incredible communications and computing power of the Internet and other information 
processing technologies such as cookies and collaborative filtering is handing companies an 
unprecedented opportunity to collect and analyze consumer information. The Internet allows 
sellers to understand their customers’ needs and wants on an individual basis.”) 
27See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 
2056-57 (2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data] (“Personal 
information is an important currency in the new millennium. The monetary value of personal 
data is large and still growing, and corporate America is moving quickly to profit from the 
trend.”). 
28See id. at 1625 (“Once Web sites identify a specific visitor, they can match her to their 
rich stores of ‘clickstream data,’ which is information about the precise path a user takes while 
browsing at a Web site, including how long she spent at any part of a site.”); Jessica Litman, 
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information to even more unscrupulous, bottom-feeding data miners30 or use it 
himself the next time she visits.31  Amazed that the producer seemed able to read her 
mind, to know her every desire,32 the mark ogles the merchandise and doesn’t even 
notice that she has spent far more time than she thought examining the goods.33  
Finally, she makes a selection and the slick huckster cleverly slips a few pages in 
                                                           
Information Privacy/Information Property,  52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (2000) (“Everything 
we look at on the Internet is noted and retained.”).  
29See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1621-32 (1999) (describing “privacy horror show” in which personal information about email 
communications, web browsing activity, interactions with various online content providers, 
Internet Service Providers, and data miners who place malicious spyware on users’ personal 
computers to harvest users’ personal data); see also Joan Stableford, Retailers Capture Buyers 
Online with Advanced Technology, WESTCHESTER COUNTY BUS. J., July 25, 2005, at 15 
(“Every time a person shops on the Web site, Lillian Vernon tracks the history of what the 
shopper buys and what types of merchandise a person views in detail, Shapiro said. The next 
time a shopper goes to the site, the Web site engine remembers what a shopper purchased and 
what types of merchandise the shopper was interested in. The next time they land on the Web 
site, those types of items will be automatically highlighted on the home page.”).  
30See Sovern, supra note 22, at 1045-46 (noting that “some companies reportedly earn 
more from selling customer lists them from selling their own goods and services”). 
31See, e.g., Matthew Haeberle, Innovation Wins in E-Retail, CHAIN STORE AGE, Dec. 2004, 
at 92 (“When we recognize that a customer who is a time-compressed mom is on our site, we 
customize our messaging to her and show her promos for digital cameras and DVDs that we 
think she will like . . . . We also tell her about our local store that is catered to her, and the kids 
area it features.”) (quoting Sam Taylor, senior VP of on-line stores at Best Buy Co.). 
32See Litman, supra note 28, at 1283-84 (“All of this information is collected, aggregated, 
and stored on computers. . . . The resulting dossier may be used, sold, published, or correlated 
with other sources of data.”); Dewan et al., supra note 26, at 10 (“The Internet allows the 
buyer and the seller to interact on a one-to-one basis and allows the seller to collect 
information from online user registration, cookies, log pages of the Web server, etc.  This, 
combined with a collaborative filtering and data mining, allows the seller to design products 
for individuals.  On-line sellers are using these technologies to target their most valuable 
prospects effectively with personalized messages and products[].”). 
33The claims of some Web marketing specialists are chilling in this respect. See, e.g., PR 
Newswire, Coremetrics and Offermatica Partner to Boost Online Conversion through 
Targeted A/B and Multivariate Testing, Apr. 4, 2005, http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx 
(press release from Web site testing and optimization firms touting ability to use online 
customer and visitor behavior to fine tune web pages to increase customer conversions). 
“Marketers need to know with certainty which online content will increase the odds 
that visitors will become customers,” said Offermatica CEO Matthew Roche.  
“Coremetrics provides the data that powers precision marketing.  Offermatica takes 
this data and automatically generates combinations of Web site content to determine 
which version will have the greatest impact on sales and profitability.  Guessing 
doesn’t work.  Knowing does.” 
Id. (providing testimonial on apparent relation between being able “to quickly test 81 different 
combinations of 4 key elements on our home page to find the best combination of promotions 
and copy.  This made a huge impact – we saw an almost 20% lift in conversions by making 
one simple change to the call to action on our main navigation zone.  With Coremetrics and 
Offermatica, my site is becoming an acquisition weapon.”). 
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front of her with an outstretched pen – “just sign here, ma’am”34 – and she is out the 
door with her new purchase.  
The information culture self-consciously defines itself35 by the technologies that 
permit the collection, processing and dissemination of vast amounts of data.36  In the 
consumer context, this information capacity permits marketers and producers to 
create detailed electronic dossiers37 of a consumer’s interests, wants, habits and 
needs.  The reality of consumer life in the information era is that marketers, data 
miners, and producers collect, process, and store incredible amounts of data about 
everything a consumer does online.  This includes the Internet searches a consumer 
performed, web sites visited, items viewed, purchases made, as well as any personal 
data surrendered by the consumer in the course of his or her shopping.38  Likewise, 
many offline interactions between consumers and producers generate a wealth of 
information on the consumer’s habits and preferences that may be collated with the 
online persona.  In the information era, consumer activities are transparent and 
known by those who can pay for that knowledge, and in most cases consumers have 
no control over how others use their personal information.39  
Producers use these electronic dossiers to identify consumers least likely to resist 
their marketing efforts, to design and market products most likely to entice the 
consumer into purchasing, and to lower the consumer’s resistance to granting 
consent to a proffered transaction.40 
                                                                
34See supra notes 8-11 and text accompanying (describing problems of assent in context of 
click-wrap and browse-wrap adhesion contracts). 
35See, e.g., Seth Godin, The New Digital Divide, Seth’s Blog, May 7, 2005, 
http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2005/05/the_new_digital.html (describing emergence 
of a new class of sophisticated information technology users called “digiterati” who choose to 
be on the cutting edge of new information technologies). 
36See Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, supra note 27, at 2056 (“Modern 
computing technologies and the Internet have generated the capacity to gather, manipulate, 
and share massive quantities of data; this capacity, in turn, has spawned a booming trade in 
personal information.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996) (describing information and data copying and 
dissemination capacities of the Internet as “continu[ing] a trend that began when Gutenberg 
invented movable type”). 
37See Litman, supra note 28, at 1284 (describing scope of information collected on every 
aspect of consumer transactions and noting “[t]he resulting dossier may be used, sold, 
published, or correlated with other sources of data”). 
38Many websites, for example, ask consumers directly to provide personal information in 
exchange for some purported benefit such as the ability to receive future emails with “special 
offers,” news about the purchase, a discount, faster processing on a rebate or just the 
producer’s ability “to serve you better.”  And to complete an order in either the online or 
offline context, of course, the consumer must divulge sufficient personal information to 
complete the order fulfillment process. 
39See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1130-
33 (2000) (“[T]he law does not generally recognize the legal right of individuals to control 
uses or disclosures of personal data.”). 
40See, e.g., Dewan et al., supra note 26, at 11, 23-24 (“The incredible communications and 
computing power of the Internet and other information processing technologies such as 
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Almost worse than the absolute transparency of our commercial activities is that 
we willingly acquiesce in the system of collection and exploitation, often to the point 
of active promotion.  Consumers themselves directly assist producers and data 
miners in collecting this information by agreeing to provide that information to a 
producer whenever they browse the Internet, purchase online, register purchased 
products, sign up for frequent shoppers’ cards at their grocery store, fill in 
sweepstakes cards, and engage in the myriad other activities of informational life.41  
As one commentator notes, commerce between producers and consumers now 
comprises “an exchange of goods or services for money and information.”42   
Moreover, consumers remain only vaguely aware that producers and data miners 
collect this information, unaware of the scope of the information collected, and 
generally unaware that producers and data miners usually disseminate their private 
information to anyone willing to pay for it.43  A recent Annenberg Public Policy 
Center report on consumer awareness of online information gathering practices, for 
                                                           
cookies and collaborative filtering is handing companies an unprecedented opportunity to 
collect and analyze customer information.  The Internet allows sellers to understand their 
customers needs and wants on an individual basis.”). 
41Professor Jessica Litman offers an especially chilling description of the scope of such 
data collection: 
Almost everything each of us does seems to generate transactional information.  
Walks [a]round the block are still unrecorded, except in those communities with 
cameras. Interactions that begin and end and stay within the home are still largely 
unreported, although everything entering and leaving by way of the phone lines, cable 
lines, satellite dishes or wireless, non-broadcast spectrum is documented.  Non-cash 
purchases are memorialized and toted up.  Large cash purchases are memorialized and 
turned in.  Cash withdrawals and deposits are recorded and saved.  Visits to the doctor, 
diagnoses, prescriptions, and referrals are coded and passed along.  Everything we 
look at on the Internet is noted and retained.  All of this information is collected, 
aggregated, and stored on computers.  Anyone with reason to do so can correlate the 
information stored on one computer with the information stored on another, and 
another, and another.  The resulting dossier may be used, sold, published, or correlated 
with other sources of data.  In the United States, that’s completely legal. 
Litman, supra note 28, at 1283-84. 
42Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of 
Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2402 (1996) (“[T]he typical transaction between a merchant or 
seller and a consumer increasingly can be characterized as an exchange of goods or services 
for money and information.”); see also Tal Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using 
Implementation-Based Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data 
Mining and the Internet Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 13, 20-21 (2004) (arguing in favor of viewing 
data collection as “a transaction between the collector and the collectee rather than collection 
of information from a passive subject” and suggesting we are selling a piece of ourselves to 
collectors in exchange for convenience and other benefits); Sovern, supra note 22, at 1040-43 
(quoting and expanding upon Murphy’s characterization). 
43See Frank Main, Your Phone Records Are For Sale, SUN-TIMES (Chicago), Jan. 6, 2004, 
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-privacy05.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (“To 
test the [cell phone records] service, the FBI paid Locatecell.com $160 to buy the records for 
an [FBI] agent’s cell phone and received the list within three hours. . . .”); see also Sovern, 
supra note 22, at 1035 (relating test case in which reporter obtained profiles of neighborhood 
children from data service while posing as a child molester who was on trial at the time of the 
request). 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss1/6
2006] PROPERTIZATION METAPHORS FOR BARGAINING POWER 79 
example, shows that a majority of online consumers do not know that charities and 
supermarkets can and do sell their personal information to other companies,44 that 
website “privacy policies” do not mean the websites will not share personal 
information with other websites and companies,45 or that Internet sites engage in 
price discrimination based upon consumer profiles.46   Worst of all, while consumers 
reported substantial concern with their ability to control use of their private 
information, “[i]n the face of all this nervousness and seeming confusion, it is 
startling that 65% of Internet-using adult Americans nevertheless say they ‘know 
what I have to do to protect myself from being taken advantage of by sellers on the 
web.’”47  
B.  Legal Responses to Information Era Consumer Contracting – Privacy and Assent 
These technological developments surrounding consumer contracting in the 
information age have generated substantial concern for contract, intellectual property 
and privacy law scholars.  In response to these phenomena, intellectual property and 
privacy law commentators have variously called for greater protections for 
individual privacy48 and tools that protect consumers from enforcement of perceived 
unfair or unreasonable terms.49  Individual information should either be propertized50  
                                                                
44See JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, OPEN TO EXPLOITATION: 
AMERICAN SHOPPERS ONLINE AND OFFLINE 3 (2005) (reporting 72% of American adults 
unaware that charities may sell names to other charities without permission, and 64% were 
unaware that supermarkets may sell personal information about buying habits to other 
companies). 
45Id. (“75% do not know the correct response – false – to the statement, ‘When a website 
has a privacy policy, it means the site will not share my information with other websites and 
companies.’”). 
46See id. at 3-4. 
47Id. at 4. 
48See Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, supra note 27, at 2094-116 (2004) 
(describing five necessary characteristics of successful system of property rights in personal 
information); Samuelson, supra note 39, at 1130-36 (surveying arguments in favor of creating 
property rights in personal information); Sovern, supra note 22, at 1074-81, 1094-116 (1999) 
(noting that producers have incentives to increase transaction costs for consumers attempting 
to protect their private information and suggesting mandatory regime in which consumers 
must affirmatively opt to permit third parties to use and sell their personal data); Mell, supra 
note 6, at 68-76 (suggesting that individuals should have a strong property interest in their 
personal information to control the uses to which third parties put that information). 
49See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 430-31(“Lawmakers and theorists currently 
are debating the need for a new set of rules to support these innovative transactions.”); John J. 
A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 
286-88 & 308-12 (2000) (describing need for regulation of standard form contracting practices 
in both online and real world environments); Radin, Online Standardization, supra note 21, at 
1145 (noting that characteristics of online contracting may lead to erosion of the “traditional 
understanding of contract”); see also Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1244-55 (noting market 
failures affecting form contracts generally and surveying possible regulatory and judicial 
responses to such market failures). 
50See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324-25 (1967) (“[P]ersonal 
information, thought of as the right of decision over one’s private personality, should be 
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– so that it can be restricted, guarded, alienated, or transferred in a market – or 
rendered inalienable and inviolate.51  Privacy torts and statutory schemes should be 
strengthened.52  Alternatively, computerized databases and other collections of 
personal data should be freely copiable without restrictions based upon contractual 
licenses.53  
Similarly, on the contract side, this view of information era contracting 
challenges the continued legitimacy of contract models based upon volitional 
bargaining and individualized assent to contract terms.54  Contract law commentators 
                                                           
defined as a property right, with all the restraints on interference by public or private 
authorities and due-process guarantees that our law of property has been so skillful in 
devising.”); see also Zarsky, supra note 42; Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 
supra note 27, at 2094 (suggesting bundle of rights property model for personal data); Julia 
Gladstone, Data Mines and Battlefields: Looking at Financial Aggregators to Understand the 
Legal Boundaries and Ownership Rights in the Use of Personal Data, 19 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313, 328-29 (2001) (arguing that consumer information “belongs” to 
consumer, who has a fundamental right to his privacy and should have that information 
protected as a property right). 
51See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1269, 1269-72 (2005) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability] 
(arguing in favor of a “hybrid inalienability” model of privacy that restricts alienability of 
private consumer information unless consumer affirmatively opts to permit use of information 
by collector). 
52See Litman, supra note 28, at 1302-11 (arguing that property-based models for 
protection of individual privacy offer “only illusory protections” and suggesting instead tort 
protections based upon breach of trust); Samuelson, supra note 39, at 1136-46 (arguing that a 
property rights based scheme for protection of personal information would be problematic 
because of the complexities of establishing a market infrastructure for information trades and 
prevention of unauthorized transfers, dissimilarities between property rights in personal 
information and other types of intellectual property, and lack of congressional authority to 
establish such a property rights system and suggesting instead direct regulation of information 
trade);  Katyal, supra note 6, at 338-44 (suggesting legislative program to protect individual 
privacy rights against invasion by copyright holders seeking evidence of copyright violations). 
53See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 42, at 2381-82 (surveying rights-based and law and 
economics-based challenges to privacy rights); William M. McGeveran, Note, Programmed 
Privacy Responses: P3P and Web Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1812, 1822-26 (2001) 
(noting importance of and benefits from disclosure and free flow of private information on 
Internet); Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 755-57 (1999) 
(analyzing proper limits of regulation of privacy rights in light of needs of liberal society, but 
noting “Coercing privacy in the strong sense of dictating what people must always keep to 
themselves and what they may disclose to others would threaten the liberal egalitarian ideal of 
tolerance.”). But see Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights and Misrepresentations, 12 
GA. L. REV. 455, 462-64 (1978) (characterizing invasion of privacy as relatively unimportant 
tort).  
54See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal 
Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1295-96 (1998) (arguing that Realist 
observation that “there can be no free-standing purely ‘private’ regime of property and 
contract” should be reiterated in cyberspace).  But see Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 
430 (noting that most commentators on contracting in Internet era agree “that the existing law 
is inadequate, but disagree about what changes need to be made” but concluding that in 
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have argued that consumer assent and bargaining power are fictions, particularly in 
the Internet context.55  The Internet-based consumer contract appears to stretch the 
volitional nature of contract past the breaking point through the use of browse-wrap 
and click-wrap terms, and to deprive e-consumers of all bargaining power except the 
naked ability to walk away from the deal.  As Professor Radin has observed, 
consumer assent to Internet-based adhesion contracts is even more fictional than with 
the traditional paper versions.56  And, as marketing models grow more sophisticated 
and intrusive,57 they threaten even that tenuous grasp on control.  Consequently, the 
classical model of “contract-as-assent” arguably should be replaced with a new 
model of “contract-as-product” in which the terms of a transaction are treated merely 
as one more characteristic of the good or service being sold.58  As products or 
                                                           
general existing contract doctrines are adequate protections for consumers contracting on the 
Internet). 
55See Jane K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 
1349-54 (2005) (analyzing problems of consumer assent in relation to purported “agreements” 
to place malicious spyware programs upon the consumer’s hard drive); Juliet M. Moringiello, 
Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1319-33 (2005) 
(describing process of Internet contracting and reviewing judicial decisions analyzing 
problems of assent associated with click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements); Margaret Jane 
Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in 
Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1311-13 (1998) (noting that Internet regulation 
through private orderings – rather than through public regulation – is problematic where those 
most responsible for private ordering – domain registries, sysops, and content creators – often 
have power to force terms on consumers through threat of exclusion); see also Eisenberg, 
supra note 7, at 240-41 (noting preoccupation of contract scholars with enforceability of 
standard form contract terms); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic 
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971) (addressing assent problems 
in standard form contracts generally and noting “But the overwhelming proportion of standard 
forms are not democratic because they are not, under any reasonable test, the agreement of the 
consumer or business recipient to whom they are delivered”). 
56See Radin, Binding Commitment, supra note 8, at 1155-60. 
57One looming marketing intrusion, for example, is the question of whether marketers can 
broadcast ad content to nearby cell phone video screens. See Matt Richtel, Marketers Want to 
Appear on the Small Screen, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at C1. 
Marketers said they were particularly excited about the prospect of eventually using 
cellphones, many of which are equipped with global positioning systems, to send ads 
to consumers based on their location. With that information, marketers could, in 
theory, send pitches from retailers to cellphone users who might be in the vicinity of a 
store. 
Id. 
58See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. 
REV. 433, 441-42, 446-52 (2003) [hereinafter Madison, Rights of Access] (noting problems 
raised by “contract-as-assent metaphor” in context of shrinkwrap and click-wrap Internet 
licensing agreements); Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 275, 315-16 (2003) (arguing that apparent consumer assent to software licensing 
terms only represents acquiescence to industry custom and consumers have no real choice if 
they want to “acquire use of needed computer software”); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 
13, at 429-31 (surveying arguments suggesting that existing contract rules, including 
protections for consumer assent are inadequate); Radin, Online Standardization, supra note 
21, at 1139-40 (suggesting that lack of real consent to contract terms in online transactions 
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commodities, such contract terms are thus subject to greater state regulatory control, 
just as the state already regulates product characteristics such as safety standards, 
warranties, and labeling.59 
III.  BARGAINING POWER AND CONSENT AS BOUNDARIES AROUND THE SELF 
Although the debates over propertization and ownership of personal information 
on the one hand, and the validity of consumer assent to browse-wrap and click-wrap 
terms on the other are interesting in their own right,60 these phenomena are also 
important for what they say about bargaining power in the information age.  
A.  The Nature of Bargaining Power 
Bargaining power represents the ability of a party to achieve a preferred outcome 
in an exchange relationship.61  Although courts and commentators often tend to think 
of contract terms and the bargaining outcome as identical,62 it is important to 
                                                           
may eventually erode the lay conception of contracts as negotiated or dickered agreements); 
John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 
285, 286-88 & 308-10 (2000) (asserting that classical assent-based model of contract does not 
hold in standard form contract context and arguing for legislatively imposed contract terms to 
govern such relations); see also Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1203-07 (describing generally 
problems with consumer assent in adhesion contract context); Todd Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176-80 (1983) (same). 
59This complaint, of course, is not unique to the information age. See, e.g., Arthur Allen 
Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 149-50 (1970). 
First of all, [regulation of contracts as things] would open up the law’s long tradition, 
accelerating of late, of direct, explicit governmental control of the quality and safety or 
[sic] products.  Autos now have mandatory seatbelts, milk is bereft of its tubercles, 
and outright poisonous substances are barred from the marketplace. Even less reified 
‘things,’ when seen as products, have been regulated as to quality for a long time. Life 
insurance contracts, for instance, have been in effect written by deputy insurance 
commisioners for years. 
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Radin, Online Standardization, supra note 21, at 1139 
(“The prevalent economic view of contract has broken down the distinction between 
agreement, . . . formerly thought of as a functional object or a collection of functional 
features.”). 
60A full analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. 
61See LARRY A. DIMATTEO, ROBERT A. PRENTICE, BLAKE D. MORANT & DANIEL D. 
BARNHIZER, VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY: RATIONALITY, BARGAINING, AND 
INTERPRETATION (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 9, on file with authors) (an earlier version 
of this piece is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=578578) 
[hereinafter BARNHIZER, BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY] (“A party has bargaining 
power if she has the ability to effect intelligently a preferred outcome in a bargaining 
relationship.”); cf. Roger Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27 AM. 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 149, 150 (1983) (defining “negotiating power” as the ability to affect 
favorably another party’s decision).  
62Many courts, for example, have concluded that the use of adhesion contracts alone 
indicates an inequality of bargaining power.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 
F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A contract of adhesion is one which is prepared by the party 
with excessive bargaining power who presents it to the other party for signature on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis.”); Pardee Const. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 292-95 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) (treating adhesive contract as evidence of inequality of bargaining power); Lytle v. 
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recognize that terms alone – even machine-imposed, adhesive, click-wrap, browse-
wrap, or paper form contract terms – represent only one facet of the parties’ power 
relationship.63  The consumer-producer bargaining power relationship also manifests 
through other indicia such as price, the “fit” between the good or service and the 
consumer’s needs, and the continuing, post-contract, post-fulfillment relationship.  
Thus, a consumer that pays through the nose for extremely favorable contract 
terms may obtain a worse outcome than one who gets a great price with lousy terms.  
Similarly, a consumer who can identify a good or service with a near-perfect “fit” 
may in fact be better off than one who obtains a less-suitable product at a lower price 
or on better terms.64  Moreover, as producers have matured into information era 
business practices, many have started focusing more upon developing long-term 
customer relationships that necessarily depend upon both delivering a positive 
shopping experience at the front end65 and maintaining a positive reputation and 
relationship after the sale has supposedly completed.66  Each of these developments 
                                                           
Citifinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 658 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (defining adhesion contract 
as form contract to be signed by the weaker party). Even outside of the strictly adhesive 
contract context, Professor Korobkin suggests that the ability to set the default terms from 
which the parties’ bargaining proceeds still provides the drafter with a bargaining advantage 
because the opposing party’s psychological bias for inaction imbues those default terms with 
“inertia” or “stickiness.”  Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: 
The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1586 
(1998) (“A bargaining party can gain a strategic advantage by establishing a set of favorable 
contract terms as the reference point for negotiations.”). 
63As Professor Ian MacNeil observes, contract terms often may be a relatively unimportant 
element in how the parties structure their relationship. See Ian R. MacNeil, Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts and Presentation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589, 595-96 (1974) (noting 
importance of party relationship in generating expectations of performance and that “most 
actual exchanges are at least partly relational”). 
64See Kohli et al., supra note 25, at 120. 
65See Paula Klein, Measuring E-Customer Satisfaction, OPTIMIZE, July 2005, at 30 
(reporting close correlation between consumer satisfaction with website shopping experience 
and online purchases); Zhenhui Jiang & Izak Benbasat, Virtual Product Experience: Effects of 
Visual and Functional Control of Products on Perceived Diagnosticity and Flow in Electronic 
Shopping, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 21 no. 3, Winter 2005, at 111, 114-18, 131 (analyzing of 
whether tools that permit consumers to engage in virtual manipulation or operation of products 
improves online shopping experience and increases likelihood of purchase); see also Stephen 
L. Vargo & Robert F. Lusch, Evolving to a New Dominant Logic for Marketing, 68 J. 
MARKETING. 1, 2 (2004) (“[M]arketing has moved from a goods-dominant view, in which 
tangible output and discrete transactions were central, to a service-dominant view, in which 
intangibility, exchange processes, and relationships are central.”). 
66See Khawa A. Saeed et al., The Relationship of E-Commerce Competence to Customer 
Value and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 22 no. 1, 
Summer 2005, at 223, 226-27 (“Superior presale and postsale service rendered by the seller 
can substantially add to the benefits received and also reduce the buyer’s nonmonetary cost 
such as time, effort and mental stress.”); Kohli et al., supra note 25, at 116-17 (discussing 
importance of producer assistance in customer decision making process to promote customer 
retention).  This transition to a customer service and retention marketing strategy is likely an 
economic necessity since producers cannot continue the excessive and unsustainable customer 
acquisition practices of the late dot-com era.  See Pandya, supra note 25, at 70-72 (noting that 
1999 customer acquisition costs averaged between $800-$1100 per customer but customer 
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increases the ability of the consumer to achieve a preferred outcome despite a 
complete lack of control over the terms of the producer’s adhesive, click-wrap 
contract. 
I have argued elsewhere that bargaining power is an infinitely complex and 
dynamic phenomenon.67  The complexity of bargaining power arises from the fact 
that almost any quality, characteristic or external event can create conditions that 
allow a bargaining party to influence the transaction to achieve a preferred 
outcome.68  Moreover, bargaining power comprises multiple forms,69 and courts 
generally lack the institutional competence necessary to perceive the real power 
relationship between the parties.70  Consequently, while bargaining power appears 
throughout contract law,71 courts have generally approached the phenomenon in a 
bipolar fashion.  A party either has bargaining power or it doesn’t, an on-off switch 
that determines in an incredibly sloppy fashion whether the apparently weaker party 
                                                           
spending averaged only about $400 per customer, suggesting importance of producer focus on 
maintaining customer satisfaction).  
67For a detailed examination of the nature of bargaining power generally and judicial 
responses to bargaining power as a legal phenomenon, see generally Barnhizer, supra note 20. 
For a discussion of the role of bargaining power in defining the boundaries of core contract 
doctrine and the proper scope of state regulation of exchanges, see generally BARNHIZER, 
BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 61. The following section summarizes 
many points explored in greater detail with those two articles. 
68See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 166-72. 
69See id. at 172-76. Specifically, most instances of power fall within three dichotomous 
characteristics: Power may be visible or hidden, real or false, exercised or unexercised.  See id. 
Visible power is that which is open and known to both sides, while hidden power includes 
sources of power known to only one of the parties that would be ineffective if revealed.  The 
real versus false dichotomy captures the fact that power depends upon perception, and that 
deception and falsehood often provide a crucial factor in achieving preferred bargaining 
outcomes.  Finally, power may be exercised or unexercised – that one of the parties had the 
ability to change the outcome of a bargain does not mean that the party will choose to do so or 
even know she has that ability.  See id. (discussing in detail the matrix created by these 
dichotomies and its usefulness for drawing attention to non-obvious sources and forms of 
power in analyzing party relationships). 
70See id. at 199-223 (analyzing general failure of judicial attempts to identify and assess 
bargaining power disparities in individual cases). 
71Contract law includes doctrines that purport to assign legal consequences to bargaining 
power disparities between the parties both as an explicit element and implicitly. For example, 
courts often treat a disparity of bargaining power as an explicit element in unconscionability 
and public policy determinations.  See, e.g., Wille v. Sw. Belle Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906-07 
(Kan. 1976) (identifying various bargaining power disparities as elements of unconscionability 
analysis); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003); cf. National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 151 (congressional findings that federal regulation 
of relations between organized labor and management is necessary because of social and 
economic disruptions caused by inequality of bargaining power).  Implicitly, bargaining power 
analyses appear to influence the outcomes of apparently unrelated doctrines such as parol 
evidence rule determinations, principles of contract interpretation and analyses of 
consideration.  See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 149.  
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will gain access to a host of contract doctrines that work to the detriment of the 
apparently stronger party.72 
Outside of the indeterminacy and incoherence of bargaining power doctrines at 
the level of individual cases, our fuzzy conception of this phenomenon also causes 
problems at a macroscopic level of analysis.  Specifically, despite this legal 
indeterminacy, bargaining power is a real phenomenon that induces practical 
consequences in real-world interactions between bargaining parties.  Gross 
disparities of bargaining power threaten the legitimacy of contract as an institution 
premised upon voluntary interactions of the bargaining parties.73  
Contract law directly and indirectly polices power asymmetries through internal 
doctrines such as unconscionability, fraud, duress, the parol evidence rule and 
consideration.74  Courts and legislatures also regulate bargaining power relationships 
on a macroscopic level by moving interactions marked by systemically flawed power 
relations along a continuum between private autonomy and public ordering.75   
Where the bargaining power relationship between transacting parties is “legally 
cognizable”—that is where courts and legislatures can consistently and credibly 
identify and assign legal consequences to a perceived power relationship—great 
disparities may justify moving the parties’ relation along this continuum away from 
“core contract” doctrines76 to other regimes such as labor or criminal law.77  
                                                                
72Thus, in Lloyd’s Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, 1975 Q.B. 326, 339 (C.A. 1974), the English jurist, 
Lord Denning, observed that inequality of bargaining power underlies many contract defenses, 
including duress, undue influence and unconscionability and suggested policing bargaining 
power disparities directly.  See also Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An 
Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 265, 344-46 (1999) (analyzing Lord Denning’s theory of inequality of bargaining power 
on equitable grounds).  Bargaining power also informs judicial analysis in the context of 
interpretation. See, e.g., First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Purolator Sec., Inc., 388 N.E.2d 17, 21-22 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1979) (bargaining power disparities affect judicial interpretation of contract terms); 
Ferguson v. Lakeland Mut. Ins. Co., 596 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (same); Smith v. 
Westland Life Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433, 440-42 (Cal. 1975) (applying reasonable expectations 
doctrine to interpret ambiguities in insurance contract against insurer in light of insured’s 
reasonable expectations); cf. Karl Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 
15 AM. ECON. REV. 665, 673 (1925) (describing contra proferentum interpretation doctrine as 
judicial device to correct information disparities about the meaning of the terms of an adhesion 
contract). Similarly, courts may vary application of the parol evidence rule depending on the 
parties’ power relationship.  See Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of 
Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7, 24 (1972) (noting empirical evidence suggests that courts 
do not apply parol evidence rule rigorously where parties suffer asymmetrical bargaining 
power). 
73See SLAWSON, supra note 4, at 23-24 (“A lack of bargaining power in one or both parties 
is a reason for limiting their freedom of contract, their contracting power, or both.”). 
74See supra note 71-72 and sources cited therein. 
75See BARNHIZER, BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 61, at 59-61. 
76See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543-45 (2003) (noting that no one theory can explain the 
enforceability and non-enforceability of promises across all of what is called “contract law” 
and instead developing a positive and normative theory of a core of contract law based upon 
transactions between business firms); Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 
YALE L.J. 1417, 1465 (2004) (“I argue that contracts involving individuals properly occupy 
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Thus, for example, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 explicitly 
recognizes that relations between management and organized labor suffered from 
systemic bargaining power disparities that threatened interstate commerce.78  
Similarly, the fact that both parties in a charitable subscription transaction can be 
described as possessing bargaining power justifies actions by courts and legislatures 
in some jurisdictions to move charitable subscriptions from the regimes of gift and 
property to a contract model in which such subscriptions are enforceable.79  In 
contrast, the bargaining power relation between parties making donative promises in 
the intrafamily context are typically tainted by messy and complicated power 
relations between family members that are not subject to easy unraveling, and 
consequently such promises are often treated as outside of contract law and 
unenforceable.80 
One problem with this theory of bargaining power as defining the scope and 
extent of contract law is that, as discussed above, courts and legislatures analyze and 
account for bargaining power on only the crudest and most simplistic level.81  This is 
primarily a consequence of the fact that the inputs to the power relationship – both in 
general and with respect to bargaining specifically – are generally impossible to 
measure, assess, isolate, or identify outside of a laboratory context.82  
In identifying the legally cognizable power relations that can move a transaction 
closer to and further from core contract doctrines, however, legal decision makers do 
                                                           
the center of our intuitive conception of contract, and I identify costs of allowing contracts that 
involve organizations to be governed by a legal regime that departs from the collaborative 
ideals that I am developing.”); cf. STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 8-9 (2004) 
(asserting that scope of legal relations and doctrines comprising “contract” are determined by 
a generally accepted consensus of scholars and legal decision makers). 
77See BARNHIZER, BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 61, at 68 (“This 
continuum of contract and contractlike transactions comprises a wide array of state 
interactions, ranging from unenforceable donative promises, to the relatively private “core”-
contract arrangements between businesses in the pluralist theory envisioned by Schwartz and 
Scott, through judicial interventions such as good faith and unconscionability, state-mandated 
substantive terms such as warranties and interest-rate caps, state-mandated bargaining 
procedures, state definitions of property rights, and on to wholly noncontract regimes such as 
criminal law.”). 
7829 U.S.C. § 151 (1935) (citing "inequality of bargaining power between employees who 
do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers" as 
justification for federal regulation of labor-management relations); see also Kevin M. Teeven, 
Decline of Freedom of Contract Since the Emergence of the Modern Business Corporation, 37 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 131 (1992) (suggesting that state “sought to cure inequalities in 
contractual bargaining positions in such areas as antitrust, insurance, labor law, transport and 
banking”). 
79See BARNHIZER, BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 61, at 90 - 91. 
80See id. at 85-91 (comparing donative promises in intrafamily and charitable 
subscriptions contexts). 
81See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 199-201. 
82See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY 
AND RESEARCH 79 (1969) (concluding that the study of power as a discrete phenomenon is “a 
bottomless swamp”).  
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not need to be completely accurate.  So long as those determinations are consistently 
repeatable and credible to other participants in and observers of the legal system, 
they continue to justify and support legislative regimes that regulate certain 
transaction types within contract and move others further away.  Thus, while an 
insured may occasionally have superior bargaining power over an insurer,83 
practically everyone accepts the proposition that insurers systemically possess 
superior bargaining power in their dealings with insureds.84  This consistent and 
credible statement of the power relationship justifies moving the policing of 
insurance contracts further from core contract doctrines through state insurance 
regulation of insurers,85 special rules of contract interpretation,86 and other non-
contract doctrines.  
But that explanation works only while the legal description of the power relation 
bears some relation to the reality it purports to regulate.  For instance, early 
twentieth-century descriptions of power relations between firms and individuals with 
respect to employment contracts involved free individuals and free employers, both 
capable of protecting their own interests in dealing with the other.87  These 
descriptions justified policing those bargains under the strong freedom of contract 
regime represented by cases such as Lochner v. New York88 and Adair v. United 
States.89   More and more, as the industrial age progressed, as employers grew in size 
                                                                
83See, e.g., Fisher v. Crescent Ins. Co., 33 F. 544, 545 (W.D.N.C. 1887) (“In cases of 
contracts for insurance the parties are not, in all respects, on equal footing, as the applicant for 
insurance has a better knowledge of the subject matter of the contract than the insurer . . . .”). 
84See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 259 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 796 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1989); David v. Oakland Home Ins. Co., 39 P. 443, 444 (Wash. 1895) (“[T]he insured 
and insurer . . . do not stand upon an equal footing. The insurer is always represented by 
persons of experience in such matters, while the insured is usually a man of much less general 
information . . . .”). 
85See, e.g., Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 374 (1921) 
(noting that state regulation governs all aspects of insurance contracts other than “whether 
they will insure or not, with whom they will insure, and for how much”). 
86See supra note 72 and sources cited therein (discussing, inter alia, reasonable 
expectations and contra proferentum doctrines). 
87See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1917) (coal 
mine owner free to refuse to employ miners who were also members of union and miners were 
similarly free to accept such terms or seek work elsewhere); Ocean Accident & Guarantee 
Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 257 P. 644, 645 (Ariz. 1927) (noting that under laissez faire 
and strong freedom of contract theories “it was gravely insisted by bench, bar, and the leaders 
of society that the individual working man, without money, friends, or influence, must be 
‘protected in his right to contract freely with his employer . . . .’”). 
88198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (holding that state has no power to interfere with employment 
contract between employee and employer by attempting to set hours and working conditions 
because such regulations interfere with parties’ constitutional liberty interest in freedom of 
contract), overruled on other grounds by Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. State of Mo., 342 U.S. 421 
(1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
89208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (“[T]he employer and employee have equality of right, and 
any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract 
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and market power, as individual workers perceived themselves to have lost whatever 
bargaining power they had in the pre-industrial era, the equal bargaining power 
claims of the Lochner regime no longer seemed to fit the actual experiences of labor 
market participants.90 
Similar to the fundamental changes in social, economic, political and cultural 
patterns that accompanied industrialization, the information age also challenges our 
underlying notions of power relationships between contracting parties.  Although the 
real impacts of these changes are still speculative, it can be argued that many of the 
industrial era protections for consumer transactions that are premised upon 
stereotyped caricatures of consumer/producer relations no longer make sense.  
Contract doctrines such as unconscionability, for example, depend in part upon clear 
divisions between powerful producers and weak consumers.  Likewise, much 
consumer protection legislation depends upon the informational and other power 
disparities between producers and consumers.  As the real power relations 
underlying these pre-information era legal regimes change, it is unlikely that the 
crude contract law models of bargaining power can continue to provide credible 
explanations for state regulation of some classes of consumer contracts. 
B.  Development of a Property Metaphor for Bargaining Power, Consent and the 
Self 
The propertization metaphor offers a compelling alternative to the crude contract 
conception of bargaining power as an all-or-nothing affair.  Many commentators 
have argued that the propertization of personal information and the commodification 
of contract in the information era justify additional regulation of consumer 
transactions.91  While both questions are interesting in their own light, they 
                                                           
which no government can legally justify in a free land.”), overruled on other grounds by 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
90See, e.g., Pound, supra note 19, at 454-56 (noting problems with assumption of strong 
freedom of contract regime that all parties had equal power to protect their interests in light of 
great perceived power disparities between large scale employers and individual employees); 
Isaacs, supra note 7, at 47 (noting that for many bargainers disenfranchised by business and 
employment practices of the early twentieth century, “freedom of contract has become a mere 
mockery”); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 156-57 (1930) (Anchor Books ed. 
1963) (noting cases upholding regulation of working conditions as an example of initial step in 
“abandoning ‘medievalism’ when [judges] begin to procure, and to rely on, carefully prepared 
factual data as to the social setting of the cases which come before them for decision”); Karl 
N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? -- An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 751 (1931) 
(“Overwhelming is the realization of how far a law still built in the ideology of Adam Smith 
has been meshed into the new order of mass-production, mass relationships.”); cf. Harold J. 
Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 140-44 (1917) (suggesting that 
formalistic employment doctrines such as the fellow-servant rule should be abandoned in light 
of changes in the employment relationship and working conditions wrought by advent of 
industrial age). 
91See Solove, supra note 12, at 1396 (“The more that is known about an individual, the 
easier it is to force his obedience.  Through the use of databanks, the state and private 
organizations can transform themselves into omnipotent parents and the rest of society into 
helpless children.”); Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 275, 322-25 (2003) (noting that wealthy can opt out of oppressive private contractual 
licensing regimes and critiquing consumer acquiescence as one cause of current oppressive 
practices in software licensing contracts); Katyal, supra note 6, at 290-316 (arguing that 
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potentially offer much more in the context of the overall bargaining power relation 
between consumers and producers in the information age. 
Both phenomena impact the ability of consumers to affect the outcome of their 
interactions with producers.  Producers already possess a significant bargaining 
power advantage over consumers through superior information regarding the product 
being sold and the value of the terms contained in their contracts.92  But while access 
to information and the ability to set the default terms of the parties’ bargain are 
usually important aspects of bargaining power,93 they are not determinative.  Instead, 
the commodification and/or propertization of these sources or components of 
bargaining power illustrates the deeper truth that the information age, with its 
defining characteristics of cheaper access to information, communications, 
                                                           
privacy invasions by private entities, such as demands for data on consumer downloading 
activities and unauthorized remote searches of consumer hard drives to monitor violations of 
intellectual property rights, are oppressive and should be more closely regulated); Hillman & 
Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 429-31 (surveying articles suggesting existing contract rules, 
including protections for consumer assent, are inadequate); cf. Radin, Online Standardization, 
supra note 21, at 1139 (suggesting that Internet-based contracting may lead laypersons to 
reconceptualize their understandings of contract in favor of regulation under contract-as-
product model). 
92See SLAWSON, supra note 4, at 26-31. As Professor Slawson succinctly notes, while 
consumers must investigate characteristics and qualities of thousands of different products in 
myriad combinations, a producer “only needs to understand the products he produces.”  Id. at 
26.  Moreover, surrogates for direct investigation by the consumer, such as relying upon a 
producer’s reputation or reports by third party investigators cannot solve the informational 
disparity because both measures provide only incomplete information about the particular 
product being purchased, if the consumer relies upon these sources at all.  See id. at 27. 
Likewise, legislative attempts to improve consumer power, such as consumer protection laws, 
do not significantly affect the power dynamic because most products today – from loans to 
automobiles – are highly complex with many attributes that producers can manipulate to make 
consumer understanding or comparisons difficult.  See id. at 28-29. And finally, the near-
universal application of standard-form contracts to all consumer transactions “enables the 
producer to take maximum advantage of his superior understanding of the product and the 
law.”  Id. at 30.  
93See, e.g., ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 97-101 (2d ed. 1991) (emphasizing 
importance of developing information about each party’s Best Alternative To Negotiated 
Agreement (“BATNA”)); RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 11-13 
(2002) (emphasizing importance of information development and protection to the negotiation 
process); H. Lee Hetherington, The Wizard and Dorothy, Patton and Rommel: Negotiation 
Parables in Fiction and Fact, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 289, 311-15 (2001) (noting, inter alia, 
importance of information as source of bargaining strength); cf. HENRY S. KRAMER, GAME SET 
MATCH: WINNING THE NEGOTIATIONS GAME 98 (2001) (noting that “[d]ata collection and 
analysis is a key to negotiation success” and “[a]lthough good data can never in itself 
substitute for negotiation power, correct information will greatly facilitate your ability to 
wring from a negotiation the most advantageous outcome reasonably attainable”); STEVEN J. 
BRAMS, NEGOTIATION GAMES: APPLYING GAME THEORY TO BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION 
227 (2d ed. 2003) (noting potential for information about other party’s preferences to disrupt 
bargaining power). 
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information processing,94 and incentives for customization, specialization and 
standardization95 has created the conditions for reconceptualizing bargaining power 
and the consent power as either property rights in themselves or as boundaries that 
define, control, and protect from invasion the fundamental property interest in the 
self. 
1.  Invasions of Self in Information Era Consumer Contracting 
With the constant onslaught of targeted marketing and commercial invasion of 
our personal privacy, the individual self is under attack, and individuals’ ability to 
control that self grows more elusive.  While rationally we might easily decide that 
the emergence of new powers and conditions allowed by the Internet and 
information technology is only a natural linear extension of the past and therefore a 
matter of degree, it is also possible that these new capabilities represent a change in 
kind distinct from historical conditions on which contract doctrines are grounded.  
After all, a nuclear bomb is still a bomb, but no one thinks of it in the same way as a 
stick of dynamite.  The general category “bomb” is the same but entirely different 
rules apply to all phases of deployment, storage, transport and use.  Similarly, pre-
information age producers gathered and used their customers’ personal information 
to increase sales and used adhesion contracts to control their risk exposure, but the 
invasion, collection, processing and use of private information and the active use of 
that information to attack the individual’s ability to withhold consent is so 
unprecedented that it can only be described as a different kind of interaction than the 
quaint standard form paper contracts of yesteryear.  
Before the information era, producers did generate consumer profiles based upon 
information gleaned from their interactions with those consumers.96  But the 
informational inputs for those models were incomplete compared to what can be 
gathered and processed today, and much of the data lacked the fluidity that 
characterizes today’s models.97  While such incomplete profiles could provide 
                                                                
94See Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, supra note 27, at 2060-73 
(describing methods of data collection, processing and commodification of personal 
information). 
95See Radin, Online Standardization, supra note 21, at 1144-46 (noting that online 
contracting environment makes possible new kinds of customization such as manufacturing 
goods to order or customization of terms, but also fosters standardization of contract terms to 
facilitate increased use of machine-made contracts). 
96See TUROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 8: 
The offline activity [collection of consumer data and using that data for targeted 
marketing to consumers] has actually been going on for quite a while.  As early as the 
1980s, financial and leisure firms as well as elite retailers were following the logic of 
developing relationships with customers based upon digital repositories and their 
treating them differently based on what they learned.  They created the databases by 
soliciting information from their customers, buying information about their lifestyles 
from data brokers, and tracking their interactions with them. 
97See Schwartz, Data Processing, supra note 3, at 1325-39 (noting that historically, 
information profiles of individuals were incomplete and that “[t]he computer changes personal 
information into a fluid form, which allows it to be applied at many stages of administrative 
decisionmaking”). 
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commercial benefits by allowing producers to track their best-valued customers, the 
limitations of the paper medium and the costs associated with maintaining such 
profiles and reacting to them would restrict the types of customers and transactions 
in which they would be most commercially exploitable.98 
In contrast, information era producers and data miners can use data harvested 
from nearly every interaction between consumers and providers of goods, services, 
charities, and political and social organizations to produce a “finely-grained”99 
electronic copy or doppelganger of individual consumers.100  Producers create and 
purchase this data solely for the purpose of building these electronic doppelgangers 
of individual consumers to tell the producer what cues and stimuli will create a 
desired response in consumers.101  In a very real sense, the doppelgangers provide 
producers with proxies for the individual’s self.  In the right combinations the 
doppelgangers may merely doom us to the boredom of fulfilled expectations. My 
doppelganger on Amazon.com, for instance, has led me to exceed my margin of 
diminishing returns in several sub-genres of science fiction.102  
                                                                
98Cf. TUROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 8 (noting that early commercial use of consumer 
profiles was restricted to high-value transactions such as financial, leisure and “elite” retailing 
firms). 
99Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra note 29, at 1620 (“As a result of cyberspace 
code, surfing and other cyberspace behavior generate finely granulated data about an 
individual’s activities – often without her permission or even knowledge.”). 
100See Sovern, supra note 22, at 1034-43, 1045-47 (detailing amount of information 
collected from individuals, use of information to create individual consumer profiles, and 
commercial use of profiles to increase sales); Katyal, supra note 6, at 241-44 (noting that 
careless consumers now transfer and sell personal information to third parties “often without 
the individual’s knowledge”). 
101See Katyal, supra note 6, at 241-44.  And although a full discussion of the issue is 
beyond the scope of this Article, it is useful to note that information and communications 
technology in many ways has increased our control over how our selves and identities 
manifest to the outside world.  First, by lowering search and information costs, the Internet 
and similar technologies assist consumers in identifying and acquiring those products that best 
fit the self image they wish to project and assist producers in identifying formerly 
unexploitable niche markets and exploiting them.  Thus, as Professor Julian Velasco suggested 
in response to an early workshop presentation of this paper, the Internet makes it possible for a 
manufacturer of leg lamps to identify and market to the geographically dispersed group of 
oddball consumers who would purchase such products. The availability of such unique goods 
in turn helps the oddballs better express their inner selves through the purchase and display of 
lamp icons generally deemed unacceptable in polite society. Second, “[o]n the Internet, 
nobody knows you’re a dog.” Peter Steiner, Cartoon,  NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61. The 
general anonymity and separation of person from identity allowed by information culture 
allows participants to craft their own preferred identity, whether it be a hip and sexy swinger 
at the other end of a particularly witty text message, a political firebrand on a discussion forum 
or blog, or an umpteenth-level battle-mage in popular massive multi-user roleplaying 
adventure games like Everquest. 
102Interestingly, the doppelgangers may produce at the margins a feedback effect between 
the consumer and her electronic profile.  Take Amazon.com’s recommendation list, which 
appears to be based partly on their own algorithms and upon the behavior of other consumers 
who purchase or review the same products.  When I make a purchase, for example, of Robert 
A. Heinlein’s “Starship Troopers,” Amazon.com logs that purchase in my profile and suggests 
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In other combinations, however, the doppelganger is manipulative and vaguely 
evil – it tells producers whether and how much to serve me as a customer,103 who I 
am and how to get me to jump when the producer pushes the right buttons.104  For 
instance, as I learned with the births of my two daughters and resulting deluge of 
junk mail, pop up ads, spam, and targeted banner ads, producers who know a 
consumer’s income, address, local school choices, and family status can prey upon a 
new parent’s insecurities regarding the future and significantly increase the chances 
of selling increased life insurance, homeschooling materials, private school options, 
college savings accounts and purported child-safety devices for the home.105  While 
many of these offers were interesting, some were so invasive and blatantly 
manipulative that I actively fantasize about where Dante would have placed 
marketers of childrens’ educational products. 
2.  Inadequacy of Contract-Based Power Models in Information Era Consumer 
Contracting 
In the information era context, the crude bargaining power models used by 
contract law cannot explain the rich and detailed texture of the real power 
relationship between consumers and producers.  In contract, courts often determine 
the parties’ bargaining power relationship and then justify that determination by 
piling on one or more categories of situations or classes that typically suffer 
bargaining power weakness.  Thus, in Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont 
                                                           
other books based upon that profile and upon purchases by other consumers who also bought 
that book.  Importantly, though, my doppelganger is not a perfect match for my tastes. It will 
tend to make some recommendations that match well – i.e., Joe Haldeman’s “The Forever 
War” – and some that lie outside the margins of my current preferences – i.e., Ursula K. 
LeQuinn’s “The Left Hand of Darkness.” By actively marketing LeGuinn’s novel, however, 
Amazon.com increases the chances that I will read it and potentially develop a new taste for 
that sub-genre. To the extent my tastes represent my self, Amazon.com’s doppelganger will, in 
effect, have changed my preferences and thus, to a slight extent, developed my personality or 
self in direction it would not have gone absent the doppelganger’s influence.  
103See Anthony Danna et al., All that Glitters is not Gold: Digging Beneath the Surface of 
Data Mining, 40 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 373-74 (2002) (noting uses of sophisticated data mining 
and analysis software to identify high-value customers with whom the producer should 
develop a relationship management strategy to retain the customer and to offer different 
content and service than that provided to low-value customers); Saeed et al., supra note 66, at 
228 (noting that organizations can use technology to “personalize, augment, or even transform 
the services they provide to customers”). 
104In a more dangerous example of the potential for harm raised by the availability of such 
detailed pictures of ourselves, the Chicago Police Department has recently warned its 
undercover officers that dozens of data mining services can provide any interested buyer with 
detailed records of their cell phone activity. See Main, supra note 43 (noting “[c]riminals can 
use such records to expose a government informant who regularly calls a law enforcement 
official” or an undercover officer who uses an undercover cell phone to call “personal 
numbers such as home or the office”).  
105See also Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 643-53 (N.J. 1971) (condemning as 
unconscionable and deceptive trade practice door-to-door educational book sellers’ practice of 
targeting low-income, limited education consumers living in primarily minority 
neighborhoods for high-pressure sales efforts to sell educational materials at 2.5 times actual 
retail value).  
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Gravel, Inc.,106 the court determined that a buyer of manufacturing equipment lacked 
bargaining power because the negotiations occurred over 45 minutes, the contract 
was signed in a parking lot and the buyer later stated he “felt he had a gun to his 
head.”107  Similarly, in Pardee Construction Co. v. Superior Court,108 the court 
explicitly excluded evidence that first-time homebuyers might have had meaningful 
alternatives to purchasing a home from the defendant’s development project.109  And 
in the other direction, as Professors Larry Garvin and Blake Morant have observed, 
small businesses typically are denied access to doctrines based upon bargaining 
power asymmetries merely because they are presumed to be sufficiently 
sophisticated to avoid the impacts of such disparities.110  
This crude model of bargaining power as an inherent quality or characteristic of 
the parties may have been necessary in the industrial and post-industrial periods.  An 
individual grunt laborer attempting to contract with a large producer probably does 
lack bargaining power in negotiating for employment terms.111  The employer has a 
functionally unlimited supply of workers, while the employee must sell his labor at 
                                                                
106412 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
107Id. at 720-23. 
108123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
109See id. at 294. 
110See Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 297 (2005) (“In their dealings with consumers, small businesses 
must give protections based on asymmetries that may not exist. In their dealings with larger 
businesses, small businesses are treated as though the parties are essentially equal, which will 
not usually be true save in the most formal sense.”); Blake D. Morant, The Quest for Bargains 
in an Age of Contractual Formalism: Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 233, 244-46 (2003) (reporting results of empirical survey showing that 
small businesses often face substantial challenges to viability, including lack of bargaining 
power). 
111The contemporary controversies surrounding employment of day laborers in many 
cities, for instance, is at least partly concerned with the hiring and “negotiation” process in 
which prospective day laborers – who are often illegal immigrants – congregate at a common 
hiring site and are hired on a job-by-job basis. See, e.g., Nathan Thornburgh, Inside America’s 
Secret Workforce, TIME, Feb. 6, 2006, at 39 (describing hiring of day laborers and noting that 
influx of illegal workers is driving down wages even for more established illegal immigrants); 
David Cho, $400,000 to Aid Day Laborers, WASH. POST, May 12, 2005, at T03 (noting that 
many day laborers are illegal immigrants, problems associated with laborers congretating at 
hiring sites such as business parking lots, and problems experienced by day laborers including 
lack of breaks and shorted pay from employers).  But see P.S. ATYIAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 339 (1979) (noting that increased bargaining power of trade unions 
was not the cause of rise in wages from early- to later-industrial era). 
The reason why the wage of the worker of (say) 1850 was only a fraction of his wage 
today is because the national product in 1850 was only a fraction of the national 
product today.  The difference made by the shift in the relative bargaining power of 
employers and workmen only affects the additional, relatively small proportion of the 
wage which the employer can pay without bankrupting himself on the one hand, and 
the worker can forgo without serious loss to himself on the other hand. 
Id.   
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some price or starve.112  Similarly, it may have been enough for Judge Skelly Wright 
that Mrs. Williams of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.113 fame was a poor, 
unsophisticated black woman on welfare to justify his suggestion that she lacked 
bargaining power and could not understand the meaning of the add-on security 
clause at issue in that case.114  
In the “bad old days” before widespread use of the Internet and other information 
technologies, consumers had high information costs, little time to shop, few sources 
from which to shop, and a relatively narrow selection of mass produced, 
standardized products and contract terms from which to choose.  The process 
involved significant costs, including time spent obtaining information about a 
product or terms, scheduling requirements, and the cost and time of transport to 
different sites at which the desired products could be found.  Any efforts that a 
consumer made at improving his or her bargaining position versus an individual 
seller were generally expensive, could affect only limited aspects of the deal, and the 
benefits were uncertain.  In purchasing an automobile, for example, a consumer 
might stop by the local library or subscribe to magazines such as Consumer Reports, 
might search the newspapers for sales and discounts, might get word-of-mouth 
references from other consumers (who were likely as ignorant as she was) about 
various products and sellers.  In other words, that consumer might spend days 
seeking out low-quality bargaining power inputs.  
The cost of these bargaining power improvements was high and the benefits 
could not clearly be measured.  Moreover, it was impossible to determine the value 
of each incremental investment in developing additional bargaining power.115  
                                                                
112See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to 
Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1106-07 (1987) (“[U]nlike producers of other 
perishable commodities, workers cannot save costs in an unfavorable market by ceasing 
production. . . . The worker cannot cease to maintain her labor power without starving her 
body.”); Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeymen Bakers of New York: The 
Journeymen Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and the Constitution, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 413, 
414 (1994) (“The fact is that the working man has only his labor to sell, and he must sell it in 
order to purchase the necessities of life for himself and his family.”); cf. RICHARD C. 
OVERTON, PERKINS/BUDD: RAILWAY STATESMEN OF THE BURLINGTON 5-6 (1982) (relating 
1870s business opinions of Charles E. Perkins, then vice-president of the CB&Q Railroad, that 
“[i]f one man can by frugality get along on fifty cents a day, and will work for that, another 
man who requires a dollar is not entitled to have it”). But see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense 
of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 975-76 (1984) (arguing that employees often 
do possess substantial bargaining power in dealing with employers). 
113350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
114See id. at 449-50 (suggesting that plaintiffs lacked bargaining power but remanding for 
futher findings). But see Eben Colby, Note, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability do to 
the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 625, 652-54 (2002) (containing a 
historical investigation suggesting that local residents who dealt with Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co. were aware of the practical effects of defaulting on credit payments, regardless 
of whether they actually understood the specific contract terms). 
115Cf. Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with 
Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 8-14 (2000) (“Power is not 
precisely quantifiable because it is complex – arising from numerous factors and their 
interrelationships both within the individual and the relationship ('social context') of the 
individual with the opponent – and based upon a nearly purely subjective analysis of those 
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Visiting one more dealership, doing one more hour of research, bringing a friend to 
the bargaining session—all of these actions theoretically could increase the 
bargaining power of a car shopper.  But given the variations between transactions 
and the high costs of collecting and organizing information on different transactions, 
whether any given investment in bargaining power could potentially yield greater 
benefits than costs was impossible to determine.  Similarly, variations between 
shoppers—in wealth, demeanor, bargaining skill, experience, knowledge, gender, 
and stubbornness—could also significantly impact the shopping process.116   
Even the most assiduous bargainer in that context could likely do little to 
improve her bargaining position, regardless of additional time, education, 
information search, and other costs incurred.  Moreover, even if Mrs. Williams—or 
any pre-information era consumer, for that matter—had taken specific steps to 
improve her bargaining position, the effects of those steps could not be measured 
because her interaction with Walker-Thomas Furniture would be unique compared to 
any other consumer.  Under these conditions, legal decision makers had no real 
choice in adopting a rough-and-ready conception of bargaining power because a 
more complex and more nuanced model could not yield superior results.117 
3.  Developing an Information Era Model of Bargaining Power 
The information era, in contrast to the paper contracting paradigm, offers a much 
more interesting picture of bargaining power.  Consumers and producers in the 
information era possess many options for improving bargaining power, options that 
are discrete, identifiable, low-cost, and—thanks to advances in data collection and 
processing, communication and standardization—carry measurable benefits.  
Information era bargaining power inputs are, in essence, commodities that can be 
identified, priced, bought, sold and owned by producers and consumers.  This does 
not mean, however, that consumers or even producers can adequately measure the 
value of every specific bargaining power input.118  Rather, with reduced information 
                                                           
factors.”).  As Adler & Silverstein note, power is based largely upon perceptions and without 
an actual contest the parties are only guessing about each other's actual bargaining power.  See 
id. at 14. 
116During my post-high-school employment at a small auto dealership a few miles outside 
the relatively wealthy community of Chagrin Falls, OH, for example, I observed first-hand 
substantial differences in the way the sales staff approached bargaining with young car buyers 
from inside town versus local buyers.  One sales person actually told me that they explicitly 
steered the buyers from town to sporty cars and rarely lowered the price significantly, whereas 
local buyers tended to bargain harder for cheaper, more practical cars.  Similarly, Professor 
Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever report that women generally negotiate less for similar 
products than men, and consequently end up paying significantly more for the same good or 
service.  See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: 
NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003).  
117Of course, courts and legislatures always had the option of doing away with specific 
bargaining power-based standards altogether. See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 193 & n.223 
and accompanying text (suggesting that legal conception of bargaining power “has proved so 
slippery and indefinable, so vague and nebulous, and so open to uncertainty that its utility for 
explaining any element of the bargaining relationship is doubtful”). 
118See infra notes Part IV.C and accompanying text (noting that despite information 
collection and processing tools it is still likely impossible to accurately assess power in 
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and transaction costs, markets can now provide additional products and services that 
increase or reduce consumer and producer bargaining power.119 
Thus, information tools lower costs associated with search, information 
acquisition and evaluation, and other transaction costs for many different consumer 
                                                           
individual cases and arguing that contract law should abandon inequality of bargaining power 
as relevant consideration in such cases). 
119These bargaining power inputs may be positive - increasing a party’s ability to control 
the outcome of the bargain – or negative – decreasing the other party’s power.  On the positive 
side, consumers, for example, have access to nearly unlimited information about producers, 
their products, their prices and their reputations.  See supra notes 121-130 and accompanying 
text (surveying informational tools available to consumers in e-commerce).  Consumers also 
can easily access inexpensive brokers for a wide range of products, have lower search costs to 
identify products that satisfy their needs and desires, and can educate themselves regarding the 
meaning of contract terms, bargaining and shopping tactics, and their legal or extra-legal 
options in the event of a dispute.  See AllBusiness.com, What Are Boilerplate Provisions in 
Contracts?,  http://www.allbusiness.com/articles/Contracts/789-1551-1777.html (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2006) (describing purposes and uses of boilerplate clauses and providing links for 
defining boilerplate contract terms); May Wong, Consumer Reports: Shopping Online 
Smarter, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://www.livescience.com/ 
technolgy/ap_051104_shop_online.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2006) (providing advice on 
effective online search, shopping and purchasing). 
On the negative side, consumers can take some steps to decrease producer bargaining 
power, such as installing protective software that prevents most types of covert online data 
mining and using Internet browsers with robust privacy protections. See, e.g., Ad-Aware 
Personal, http://www.lavasoftusa.com/software/adaware/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (“Ad-
Aware Personal provides advanced protection from known data-mining, aggressive 
advertising, Trojans, dialers, malware, browser hijackers, and tracking components.”). The 
Mozilla Foundation’s open-source Firefox web browser, for example, provides strong privacy 
protections with the base program, including easily accessible features that permit users to 
exercise substantial control over typical invasions such as pop-up advertisements, cookie 
downloads and an easy means of deleting all clickstream data from the user’s hard drive. See 
Firefox 1.5, http://www.mozilla.com/firefox/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (reviewing security 
and privacy features of Firefox web browser); see also Allen Fear & Richard Vamosi, CNET 
Review of Firefox 1.5, http://reviews.cnet.com/Firefox_1_5/4505-9241_7-31516411-
2.html?tag=nav (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (reviewing features of open-source Firefox web 
browser program, including security enhancements). Other programs permit consumers to bar 
all incoming email, cookies, javascript programs, and other privacy invasions except for those 
coming from trusted “whitelisted” sources, i.e., a list of trusted sources that are always 
permitted to operate upon the user’s computer or interface.  See Wickipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whitelist (last visited May 7, 2006).  Finally, the truly paranoid 
can access a wide array of free- and pay-site Internet browsing anonymizers that will prevent 
data miners from grabbing any meaningful clickstream data, disposable email addresses, and 
remailers. See How Anonymizers Work, http://www.livinginternet.com/i/is_anon_work.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (“An anonymizer protects all of your computer's identifying 
information while it surfs for you” by routing the individual web surfer’s clickstream through 
a separate computer or network, thereby placing a virtual wall between third-parties and the 
individual’s clickstream data); Heinz Tschabitshtcher, Top 10 Disposable Email Address 
Services, http://email.about.com/cs/dispaddrrevs/tp/disposable.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2005) 
(describing disposable email services that permit consumers to provide producers with valid 
email addresses that can be deleted if used to send spam and providing links to popular sites); 
Living Internet, Remailers, http//www.livinginternet.com/i/is_remailers.htm (last visited Feb. 
25, 2006) (“A remailer enables you to send and receive email while keeping your real email 
address secret, by retransmitting your email with an anonymous return address.”). 
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transaction types to near zero.120  The cost of performing an Internet price 
comparison search for most products is de minimus, but often yields significant price 
advantages.121  Similarly, information technology lowers the cost of identifying 
suitable products and salient product features, as well as research on negotiation 
tactics,122 the meaning and legal effect of boilerplate contract terms,123 and easy 
access to legal representation if the deal goes sour.124  Consumers unskilled at 
                                                                
120See Michael R. Galbreth et al., A Game-Theoretic Model of E-Marketplace 
Participation Growth, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 22 no. 1, Summer 2005, at  295, 298 (“given 
the possibility of a high level of buyer and seller participation, electronic markets can enable 
nearly perfect competition”); Cenk Kocas, Evolution of Prices in Electronic Markets Under 
Diffusion of Price-Comparison Shopping, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 19 no. 3, Winter 2003, at 
99, 100 (noting that Internet creates potential for efficient markets, although that potential has 
not yet been fully realized); Amy E. Cortese, Good-bye to Fixed Pricing?, BUS. WK., May 4, 
1998, at 71-72 (projecting that Internet and information technology will reduce menu costs – 
the costs that producers incur to adjust their prices – and interaction costs so much that 
competitive bidding will become the norm for purchasing goods and services). 
121See Pandya, supra note 25, at 70 (“[I]nstead of clicking across multiple sites, 80% to 
90% of buyers of books and CDs visited only one site, even though prices of books and CDs 
across Web sites varied by as much as 25% to 30%.”); see also TUROW ET AL., supra note 44, 
at 7-8 (noting overall lack of consumer sophistication regarding Internet pricing practices, data 
collection, and fraudulent schemes). 
122See, e.g., Kelly Blue Book, http://www.kbb.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (providing 
links to articles providing advice on researching, financing, negotiating and purchasing new 
and used automobiles); Edmunds.com, http://www.edmunds.com/advice/ (last visited Jan. 20, 
2006) (same). Intriguingly, Edmunds.com also provides an extensive advice section relating 
specifically to women that identifies the existence of a gender gap in dealership treatment of 
car buyers and advises women about avoiding common discriminatory tactics.  See 
Edmunds.com, The Women and Family Car Guide, http://www.edmunds.com/women/index. 
html (last visited Jan. 20, 2006); cf. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 116, at 115-16 
(noting that women “are willing to pay as much as $1,353 to avoid negotiating the price of a 
car, compared to half as much, $666, for men”). 
123See, e.g., Curt M. Langley & Jason T. Martin, Boilerplate Terms, Rules of 
Interpretation, and Developments in Drafting Contracts, http://images.jw.com/com/ 
publications/204.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006) (explicitly identifying and explaining 
numerous types of boilerplate terms); Jordan Schrader P.C., Don’t Get Burned By the 
Boilerplate, http://www.jordanschrader.com/articles/article0062.html (last visited May 7, 
2006) (discussing legal effect of boilerplate terms and surveying reasonable expectations 
doctrine); Allbusiness.com, Top 10 Contract Drafting Mistakes, http://smallbusiness.yahoo. 
com/r-article-a-1401-m-1-sc-11-top_ten_contract_drafting_mistakes-i  (last visited May 7, 
2006) (listing boilerplate terms of particular importance to contract drafters in small business 
context).  
124A Google search on February 18, 2006 for “Legal Services,” for example, produced 
1.25 billion hits, with the top three commercial links leading to Prepaid Legal Services, Inc. 
and two attorney referral services, Legal Connection and Legal Match. See Pre-Paid Legal 
Services, Inc., http://www.prepaidlegal.com (offering a variety of legal services plans with 
varying levels of consultation and representation for about $25 per month, depending upon 
jurisdiction); LegalMatch, http://www.legalmatch.com (lawyer referral service); Legal 
Connection, http://www.legalconnection.com (lawyer referral service).  
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negotiation can obtain free advice or locate negotiation training,125 acquire the 
services of agents or brokers for many different types of transactions,126 including 
insurance, automobiles, homes and employment, and – more importantly – check 
agent reputations and the results delivered by the agents.127  
In other contexts, the ability of the parties to improve their own or diminish their 
opponent’s bargaining power is less clear.  The relative détente in terms of 
information between consumers and producers means that consumers in the United 
States128 have lost the battle for control over their private information,129 but 
                                                                
125The Internet is replete with free content advising consumers on shopping and 
negotiation strategies and tactics.  See, e.g., May Wong, Consumer Reports: Shopping Online 
Smarter, http://www.livescience.com/technology/ap_051104_shop_online.html (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2006) (providing search, information gathering, and shopping strategies and tactics); 
Kelley Robinson, 5 Ways to Negotiate More Effectively, http://sbinfocanada.about.com/cs/ 
marketing/a/negotiationkr.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (providing strategies and tactics for 
improving negotiation skills). At least one negotiation services firm – The Negotiation Skills 
Company, Inc. – provides a discussion forum in which forum participants can submit specific 
questions regarding negotiation tactics and strategies to a specialist and review and search past 
answers dealing with a wide array of situations.  See The Negotiation Skills Company, Inc., 
Questions from our Website Visitors and Answers from TNSC, http://www.negotiationskills. 
com/qa.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). 
126See, e.g., Mike Hudson, Using a Car Broker to Buy Your Next Vehicle, http://www. 
edmunds.com/advice/buying/articles/103283/article.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006) (offering 
advice on hiring and using a broker for automobile purchases); see also Ken Shaw, Hiring an 
Auto Broker Rarely Saves You Money; It's Like Two People Trying to Share a Meal that's 
Meant for One Some in the Business Double-Dip, Collecting Fee From Client, Dealer, 
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 30, 2005, at G12 (arguing that automobile brokers are unlikely to deliver 
significant savings to clients given auto manufacturer and dealer movements toward higher-
volume/lower-margin sales strategies). 
127See Hudson, supra note 126 (“But like any deal, it's important to do a little research on 
the broker before you jump headlong into their arms, drawn by promises of lower prices and 
advocacy for your needs.”). 
128The European Union purports to take a much more protective attitude toward 
propertization of personal information through its Data Privacy Directive. See, e.g., Julia M. 
Fromholz, The European Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 466-69 (2000) 
(surveying Data Privacy Directive protections against collection of personal information). 
129Theoretically, it is possible to maintain some control over personal information.  A 
substantial portion of American adults, for example, choose to remain offline for various 
reasons, including lack of interest, lack of time, fear or lack of understanding of technology, 
fear of fraud, pornography, and lack of access.  See SUSANNAH FOX, THE PEW INTERNET & 
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, DIGITAL DIVISIONS 2-4 (2005); AMANDA LENHART ET AL., THE PEW 
INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, THE EVER-SHIFTING INTERNET POPULATION 10-13 
(2003). Market forces, as well as general pique with Microsoft over its perceived reputation 
for privacy and security protections, have driven the development of technological privacy 
protections such as the Firefox browser, Privacy Protection Protocols (P3P), adblockers, 
Internet browsing anonymizers, remailers, and encryption.  On the other hand, in researching 
this paper, I attempted to install a robust suite of such privacy tools.  After much investigation, 
downloading, installing, tweaking, cursing, and more tweaking, my Internet browsing has 
slowed to a crawl, and I am still often forced to rely upon the Internet Explorer browser to 
view important legal research databases and .pdf files. 
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producers have likewise lost or given up substantial control over their pricing 
information130 and online reputations.131  And, as the e-commerce format matures, 
producers are shifting from a customer acquisition model of marketing and service to 
a customer retention model.132  Under the latter model, producers increasingly 
compete on the basis of customer service and improving or maintaining customer 
relationships, rather than on price.133 
On the producer side of the scale, it is important to note that such dramatically 
expanded access to information is not a panacea to consumer bargaining power 
deficiencies.134  Consumers still cannot negotiate or shop contract terms beyond a 
                                                                
130See F. GERARD ADAMS, THE E-BUSINESS REVOLUTION & THE NEW ECONOMY 140-42 
(2004) (noting significant cost savings in B2C and B2B e-commerce contexts over paper 
contexts, as well as substantial unmeasured gains resulting from convenience and greater 
access to information). 
131As one example of this lack of producers’ control over their online reputations, 
consumers have developed many “corporate complaint” websites designed to spread 
information about negative experiences the consumers have suffered with particular 
businesses.  Because such sites are as readily available to consumers as the producer’s own 
site, they may have a significant impact on some firms.  See Ronald F. Lopez, Corporate 
Strategies for Addressing Internet “Complaint” Sites, Aug. 1999, http://www.construction 
weblinks.com/Resources/Industry_Reports__Newsletters/August_1999/august_1999.html  
(last visited Feb. 13, 2006) (noting stories of two businesses – EPS Technologies and Express 
Success, Inc. – that apparently suffered significant lost revenues as a result of poor responses 
to corporate complaint sites).  Courts have generally rejected firms’ attempts to shut down 
such negative websites.  See Lucas Nursery and Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 
810 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that a noncommercial consumer complaint site does not violate 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), where consumer operated 
site solely to complain of producer’s service and did not register domain name to sell to 
business); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2004) (same); Bally Total 
Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F.Supp. 2d 1161, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting claims 
of trademark infringement, trademark dilution and unfair competition against consumer who 
operated website titled “Bally’s Sucks”). But see Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 
672, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a noncommercial consumer complaint site that uses 
firm’s mark in domain name may violate Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d), if cybersquatter registered domain name with “bad faith intent to profit”). 
132See supra notes 63 - 66 and accompanying text. 
133See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 469-70 (suggesting that Internet 
producers are particularly sensitive to maintaining their online reputations and may thus avoid 
enforcing onerous contract terms); Report Shows Top Online Retailers Are Leaving Money on 
the Table; Improvements in Online Customer Satisfaction Could Improve Bottom Line, BUS. 
WIRE, June 1, 2005 (“In many cases, companies that are competing primarily on . . . price are 
competing on the wrong thing.  Our study shows that price matters some of the time but key 
aspects of the site experience matters (sic) 100 percent of the time – literally 100 percent.”). 
134Professor Slawson has expressed substantial skepticism about the ability of consumer 
product information providers to affect significantly the producer’s substantial advantage over 
the consumer in information and bargaining power. See SLAWSON, supra note 4, at 27 (noting 
that while Consumer Reports and other special interest magazines can slightly reduce the 
producer advantage, the usefulness of such reports is limited by both the consumer’s ability to 
understand the information presented, the consumer’s limited attention span, and the fact that 
it is impossible to investigate more than a small fraction of the total purchases made by 
consumers).  
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few salient product characteristics such as price, the color of the good, or the length 
of the insurance term.  Moreover, at least some producers appear to be responding to 
price transparency and low menu costs by either hiding their prices135 or by offering 
different prices to different buyers based upon characteristics such as buyer loyalty 
or buyer sophistication.136  Similarly, many providers have incentives to vary the 
                                                                
135For example, I have noticed that some of the larger web retailers such as Amazon.com 
have started withholding prices of some sale items unless I put those items in my online 
shopping cart.  Theoretically, this practice could prevent competitors from employing web 
search programs to survey Amazon.com’s prices on various items. Cf. Patricia L. Bellia, 
Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2176-78 (2004) (surveying cases 
involving property-based claims by e-commerce producers against third parties who used 
software robots to extract producer pricing information for commercial use).  Amazon.com’s 
explanation for this practice suggests that they are attempting to prevent third parties from 
undercutting their prices: 
The "click for price" message indicates an additional discount is in effect, and this 
discount is calculated in the Shopping Cart.  You can see this price by clicking the 
product name and then selecting the Add to Cart button on the product information 
page.  Please be assured that simply adding an item to your cart does not obligate you 
to buy it--you can always delete the item from your cart if you decide not to purchase 
it. 
Amazon.com, Why Don’t We Show the Price?, http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/ 
feature/-/174014/002-9516208-0776028 (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). An equally plausible, 
albeit more cynical, explanation is that a consumer is more likely to purchase something that is 
already in his online shopping cart than something that can be evaluated and ignored without 
taking any steps toward commitment.  Cf. Melissa Carpanelli, Combatting Shopping Cart 
Abandonment, Entrepreneur.com, available at http://www.aol.entrepreneur.com/aolsb/article 
/0,4558,318313,00.html (last visited May 7, 2006) (noting econsumers abandon approximately 
half of online shopping carts). 
136See Anita Ramasastry, Web Sites Change Prices Based on Customers' Habits, 
CNN.com, June 24, 2005, http://ucg.net/2005/LAW/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/index. 
html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (noting Internet “enables businesses to collect detailed 
information about a customer's purchasing history, preferences, and financial resources – and 
to set prices accordingly”); Paul Krugman, Reckoning; What Price Fairness? N. Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 4, 2000, at A35 (opining that price discrimination (or ‘dynamic pricing’), while unfair, 
may actually be good for the economy because the practice efficiently segments markets); 
Joseph P. Bailey, Internet Price Discrimination: Self-Regulation, Public Policy, and Global 
Electronic Commerce, May 1, 1998, at 3-4, http://www.tprc.org/abstracts98/bailey.pdf (noting 
that reduced menu costs in e-commerce context promote ability of producers to engage in 
price discrimination, but that “in many cases, consumers can develop a strategy to counteract 
price discrimination”).  As Turow et al. note, “[P]rice discrimination is a logical corollary to 
behavioral targeting.” TUROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 10.  In addition to offline environments 
in which producers such as financial institutions, department stores and supermarkets profile 
customers and offer differentiated service to high- and low-value customers, e-commerce 
provides a unique dynamic pricing opportunity for producers: 
Merchants consider the online environment a particularly ripe area for such “dynamic 
pricing” -- that is, for first-degree price discrimination driven by behavioral targeting.  
Writing in Harvard Business Review, associates from McKinsey & Company chided 
online companies that they are missing out on a “big opportunity” if they are not 
tracking customers' behavior and adjusting prices accordingly. Consultants urge 
retailers to tread carefully, though, so as not to alienate customers. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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quality of their informational offerings in order to better segment their markets.137  
And the jury is still out on whether increased competition and information on 
contract terms will force producers to adopt efficient terms in their online or offline 
adhesion contracts.138  
The bottom line for this contest is that both consumers and producers have a 
wider, more robust, and more clearly defined array of bargaining power tools 
available than at any time in the past.  But more important than potentially 
heightened consumer power, the costs of many bargaining inputs have diminished 
and the benefits are sufficiently identifiable that investments in additional bargaining 
power inputs now make sense in many more contexts than in pre-information era 
consumer contracting.  In other words, the significance of information era bargaining 
power tools is not just that there are more potential ways to improve consumer 
bargaining power, but also that consumers are better able to take advantage of those 
tools over a wider variety of transactions. 
IV.  BARGAINING POWER AND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A PROPERTIZATION 
METAPHOR 
The contract law model of bargaining power cannot account for these drastically 
varied and dynamic changes to the bargaining power relationship between consumer 
and producer.  In contrast, the commodification and propertization of personal 
information and producer contract rights provide a useful metaphor for 
                                                                
137See Frederick J. Riggins, Market Segmentation and Information Development Costs in a 
Two-Tiered Fee-Based and Sponsorship-Based Web Site, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 19 no. 3, 
Winter 2003, at 69, 73-74 (noting that while information dissemination and distribution on 
Internet is essentially costless regardless of quantity of information disseminated, many 
providers of information goods on the Internet have incentives to offer low-quality 
information goods to low-end consumers and superior-quality information goods to high-end 
consumers willing to pay). Thus, many content providers maintain Web sites with two tiers of 
content – free low-quality content and high-quality content available for a subscription or fee.  
138Professors Hillman and Rachlinski, for example, note that in the paper and online 
contracting paradigms “[t]he ability of businesses to identify efficient allocation of risks 
[through contract terms] also gives them the opportunity to exploit consumers by getting them 
to accept terms that inefficiently shift risks to consumers.”  Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 
13, at 440 (citing Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective 
Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269-73, 1275 (1993) 
(“[T]he law has given drafters of form contracts the power to impose their will on 
unsuspecting and vulnerable individuals.”)).  Theoretically, competitive pressures should force 
reputation-sensitive producers with inefficient contract terms to adjust those terms in response 
to market demands, even if only a small portion of potential customers are savvy enough to 
demand such terms.  See id. at 442-44 (also noting situations in which producers would not 
have incentives to provide efficient contract terms, including lack of sufficient number of 
savvy consumers, lack of concern over reputation, and producers’ ignorance of their own 
contract terms).  The online business environment – where disgruntled e-consumers can 
quickly communicate their beefs with particular producers to all other interested e-consumers 
– potentially ameliorate producers’ ability to impose inefficient terms or at least their 
willingness to enforce particularly harsh terms.  See id. at 469-74. But see Korobkin, supra 
note 7, at 1217-44 (arguing that producers have strong incentives, in light of boundedly 
rational nature of consumers, to offer low-quality, non-salient contract terms and other product 
attributes and compete only on nearly universally salient product characteristics such as price). 
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reconceptualizing how to account for and react to bargaining power between 
contracting parties.  First off, let me make clear that in analogizing the consent 
power or bargaining power to property rights, I am not talking about a return to 
Lochnerian ideals of a substantive due process right or a property right in freedom of 
contract.139  Nor am I addressing whether consent should be protected under a regime 
of property or liability rules.140 
Rather, I am intrigued by the idea of property as a means of protecting the 
individual against claims of the state and of other private entities.  As Professor 
Radin notes, the creation or elimination of property rights in any subject matter has 
profound policy implications not just for the “thing” being propertized, but also 
within surrounding legal “neighborhoods” such as “contractual ordering, 
competition, and freedom of expression.”141  For Radin, propertization refers to a 
dynamic process by which a society debates and defines which tangible or intangible 
things should be subject to control by property owners and how much control those 
owners should have in relation to the rights of other members of society.142  The 
information propertization phenomenon is the process by which the state and society 
recognize property rights in information, data collections, and creative works and 
determine how much control the “owners” of these newly-created property interests 
should have over that information.143  In that context, Radin makes a key observation 
that the policy debate over whether and how much to propertize such information 
“should take account of information propertization’s legal milieu” to maintain 
coherent “doctrinal, policy, and practical boundaries . . . [and] achieve sound 
economic and social policy as expressed and implemented through the law as a 
whole.”144 
                                                                
139See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (finding statute that prohibited 
termination of employee for membership in labor union unconstitutional as “illegal invasion of 
the personal liberty as well as the right of property of the defendendant, Adair”) overruled on 
other grounds by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
140See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and 
Related Doctrines, 60 U .CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1993) (distinguishing between unconscionability 
as a property rule that prohibits enforcement of any part of contract obtained improperly and 
as a liability rule that prohibits only enforcement of unreasonable terms). 
141Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and its Legal Milieu, 
54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23 (2006). 
142See id. at 23-24. Radin identifies five characteristics of the “investigation of whether 
something is or ought to be property or a property right.”  First, property is controlled by 
society.  Second, propertization (and by implication “depropertization”) is a dynamic process 
whereby things move in and out of a property regime.  Third, “becoming property is a 
process,” and, fourth, a thing involved in that process may move anywhere along a continuum 
of greater or lesser property rights.  Finally, the lines between property and not-property are 
subject to debate.  See id.  
143See id. at 25-26. 
144Id. at 27; see also Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstruction of Property: Property as 
a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 363 (2002) (“[I]f courts and legislatures 
treat idea-expression, identity-expression, and information-expression as property, they should 
consider the range of interests in the objects of this intellectual property, particularly interests 
in using such objects for free expression of political, educational, and cultural speech. Property 
is a web of interests, not a unitary entitlement.”). 
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While Radin’s observations are important for the suggestion that intellectual 
property law must account for doctrine and policy in surrounding regimes like 
contract, competition law, and free speech, it is also true that the surrounding legal 
regimes can benefit from improved heuristics drawn from the propertization 
metaphor.  This is particularly true with conceptions of bargaining power in contract 
law, which traditionally have underdeveloped notions of the real power relations 
between bargaining parties and relied instead upon stylized, formalistic, and static 
legal responses to perceived power imbalances.145  
In contrast to the equal/unequal power dichotomy typically found in judicial 
contract law analyses, property speaks directly to discrete interests subject to the 
control of the property owner and to the owner’s right to exclude others from 
invading that interest.146  The meaning or core idea of private property itself is 
uncertain,147 ranging from nothing more than a temporary and revocable license 
granted by the state and subject to change at any time148 to a strong or near-absolute 
dominion by a private person over things, land, ideas, and information.149  But at its 
                                                                
145See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 213-16 (surveying judicial use of status characteristics 
in bargaining power analyses); see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code--
The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 556-57 (1967) (noting courts “seem 
continually to have taken a kind of sub rosa judicial notice of the amount of power of certain 
classes of people to take care of themselves, often without too much inquiry into the actual 
individual bargaining situation.”). 
146See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, What is Property?  Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 372, 377-390 (2003) (surveying theories of property and characterizing “the 
right to exclude [as] part of the unified set of rights that constitute the concept of property that 
is defined and protected by our legal institutions”).  
147See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 4 
(2003) (“We seem, in fact, to have multiple conceptions of the power of property in law – 
some of which strongly protect individual interests, in the way that rights are traditionally 
understood, and some of which do not.”).  Given that I am interested in property and 
propertization solely for metaphorical purposes in developing a reconception of bargaining 
power in the consumer context, this Article is purposefully agnostic regarding the debate over 
the true nature and justification of property and property rights. 
148See Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, The Idea of Property in Land, in LAND LAW: 
THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 41-43 (Susan Bright & John Dewar, eds. 1998) (“[T]he concept of 
property in land may well denote no more than a temporarily licensed form of utility or user 
privilege which may be extended, varied, or withdrawn at the sole discretion of the state and 
on terms dictated by it.”); Daniel W. Bromley, Private Property and the Public Interest: Land 
in the American Idea, in LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST: PRIVATE CLAIMS AND THE COMMON 
GOOD 29 (William G. Robbins & James C. Foster eds. 2000) (“Land rights are granted by the 
polity because of the larger social benefits that arise therefrom. . . . But that grant of 
ownership, that consent, must always be predicated upon the larger social good.”); see also 
UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 147, at 3 n.9 (quoting Gray & Gray, supra, as one extreme in 
range of possible theories of property rights).  
149See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1697 (1999) (“Courts seem to be replacing the traditional rationale for 
trademark law with a conception of trademarks as property rights, in which trademark 
‘owners’ are given strong rights over the marks without much regard for the social costs of 
such rights.”); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 873, 895-904 (1997) (observing trend in favor of treating information and intellectual 
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heart, the idea of property concerns control and exclusion.150  Property rights are 
those rights that permit an individual to secure and control his relationship with the 
claimed property to the exclusion of others.  
This metaphor incorporates well into the analysis of bargaining power.  At its 
core, bargaining power represents the ability of a party to achieve a preferred 
outcome in an exchange transaction.  In exercising bargaining power, a party asserts 
a species of control or dominion over his self, expressing preferences for one bargain 
or set of terms over another.  Thus, at this level, bargaining power establishes one set 
of boundaries by which a bargaining party controls or owns his self in the bargaining 
context.151  At another level, individual inputs to bargaining power may be described 
as being propertized.  For example, information is often noted as a key element of 
bargaining power.  The information economy represents the current pinnacle of a 
process of developing vast quantities of information into collections that can be 
manipulated, processed, and divided into discrete units that markets can evaluate and 
offer for sale to producers and consumers alike.  As information becomes propertized 
and “ownable” in the information economy, that component of bargaining power 
likewise becomes more and more like property.152 
By viewing bargaining power in terms of discrete, property-like inputs supplied 
by the market that consumers can evaluate and invest in to improve their position 
and in turn protect their ability to control manifestations of their selves through 
contract, the propertization metaphor creates the potential for developing a more 
realistic mechanism for evaluating the parties’ relative power.  As discussed below, 
however, this improved heuristic for assessing relative power ironically may destroy 
the inequality of bargaining power doctrine as a legally meaningful device for 
judicial evaluation of individual cases.  The value of the propertization heuristic 
instead lies on the more general level of legislative action in which both courts and 
                                                           
property as strong or absolute property rights and concluding that propertization of intellectual 
property law is “a very bad idea”); cf. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, supra 
note 27, at 2058 (defining property as “any interest in an object, whether tangible or 
intangible, that is enforceable against the world”). 
150See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347, 354 (1967) (“Private ownership implies that the community recognizes the right of the 
owner to exclude others from exercising the owner's private rights.”); LAWRENCE C. BECKER, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 18-23 (1970) (“[O]wnership typically has 
something to do with the right to use, the right to transfer, and the right to exclude others from 
the thing owned”); David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 545, 558-61 (2002) (noting that while private property rights imply 
that “use by one individual precludes simultaneous use by another,” few property interests are 
purely open or purely private); cf. Mossoff, supra note 146, at 377-92 (observing that the right 
to exclude is an essential, but not sufficient, characteristic of property and is a corollary of the 
substantive possessory rights of acquisition, use and disposal). 
151Cf. Katyal, supra note 6, at 233 (“[I]n  real space, property rights, coupled with 
architecture serve as a defensive shield to protect privacy.”). 
152While information is the easiest example of a bargaining power input that is in the 
process of propertization, other facets of negotiation strength are also subject to this process. 
For example, another common indicator of bargaining power – the availability of meaningful 
alternatives – is the implicit foundation of many Internet-based goods and services, such as 
price comparison websites, online travel agencies, and Internet auction sites.  
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legislatures determine which transaction types should be regulated according to 
“core” common law contract doctrines and which suffer from such systemic 
disparities of bargaining power as to require state intervention to protect weaker 
parties against exploitation. 
A.  Propertization as an Improved Heuristic for Assessing Power Relationships 
Property’s foundation in discrete boundaries upon the rights of individuals 
potentially provides a much more detailed depiction of bargaining power in the 
information age than the on/off dichotomy of contract law.  The contract model for 
assessing bargaining power looks primarily to limitations on a party’s bargaining 
power.  Did the parties lack meaningful alternatives?  Was one of the parties 
operating under necessity?  Did the parties fit within the traditionally weak or strong 
status classifications such as poverty, gender, age, education, business sophistication 
and so on?153  Once the court satisfies that determination – one way or the other – the 
inquiry stops.154  
This contract-based view of bargaining power phenomena may make sense in a 
pre-information era context in which the noise created by high information costs and 
wide variations between transactions obscures the availability, effects, and benefits 
of actions that could possibly increase or decrease bargaining power.  Under this 
view, bargaining power is not a means for protecting consent or control of the self, it 
is just a medium, like air, in which interactions take place. We may know when it is 
present or absent, and we can occasionally sense movements in that medium, but we 
generally do not attempt to discern its component parts or track its impact upon other 
objects.  As a consequence, it makes little sense to ask what parties could have done 
to improve their bargaining power or to protect their ability to withhold consent 
because post hoc judicial assessments of any particular course of action will be 
purely speculative.155  
Post-information era advances in information and communications technology, 
however, mean that parties (and possibly courts and legislatures) can now identify 
                                                                
153See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 200-01 (“Typical characteristics of individual parties 
relied upon by courts to support an inference of inequality of bargaining power include wealth, 
business sophistication, education or knowledge, race, gender, "size" of the parties, monopoly 
power, and consumer status.  And as a final alternative, many courts eschew standards for 
assessing inequality of bargaining power, relying instead upon a "we-know-it-when-we-see-it" 
approach.); see also supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text (noting traditional bargaining 
power inputs). 
154See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (noting bipolar fashion in which courts 
approach bargaining power analyses). 
155Notably, however, courts have occasionally suggested that parties could – and should – 
have taken alternative courses to improve their bargaining position.  See, e.g., Deminsky v. 
Arlington Plastics Machinery, 638 N.W.2d 331, 342-43 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that 
provision requiring purchaser of plastic manufacturing machinery indemnify seller for seller’s 
negligence or product defects was not unconscionable, in part because purchaser could always 
have chosen to buy machinery elsewhere or to forego acquiring machinery entirely); Ryan v. 
Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 403-04 (Utah 1998) (observing that employee 
presented with adhesive employment contract including at-will employment clause was not 
coerced into signing agreement because employee always had the option of quitting and 
seeking work elsewhere).  
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discrete bargaining power inputs and, in many cases, make rough value assessments 
of those additional inputs in relation to the proposed transaction.  More importantly, 
we can assess whether a party had any meaningful options for improving his or her 
negotiation position and whether the party unreasonably failed to do so.  Again using 
the automobile shopping context as an example, buyers with Internet access156 can 
acquire basic information on the product, the manufacturer, the seller, prices, 
warranty options, and other salient characteristics at minimal expense.  For about 
five dollars, a car buyer can subscribe to Consumer Reports for one month and order 
new car price reports that include information on dealer incentives and rebates.157  
Twenty to twenty-five dollars will buy a vehicle history report detailing whether the 
vehicle has ever been in an accident, flooded, burned, rejected under state lemon 
laws, and other major issues.158  For as little as  $200, a buyer with little time or 
bargaining skill can hire an auto broker to negotiate the purchase for them.159  And 
on the back end of the deal, third-party insurers compete for extended warranty 
business on both new and used cars.160  While the market values of such services do 
not necessarily portray the exact benefits a consumer will receive in terms of 
increased bargaining power, the fact that the market offers and identifies a particular 
value for such services permits consumers at least to evaluate and make a decision as 
to whether to invest in a particular input. 
B.  Bargaining Power as a Protection of the Property Interest in the Self 
Contract concerns manifestations of the self in the objective world through the 
exercise of consent.  Consent provides an indication of personal identity to the world 
as the self manifests its preferences for some types of contracts and not others.161  
                                                                
156Approximately 22% of American adults claim they have not used the Internet or email 
and that they do not have Internet access at home. See SUSANNAH FOX, DIGITAL DIVISIONS 3 
(2005).  The Pew Internet & American Life Project reports that 32% of these non-Internet 
users have no interest in accessing the Internet, while only 31% of the non-users completely 
lack access, and smaller minorities of non-users avoid accessing the Internet because “they are 
too busy or think going online is a waste of time,” or getting access is difficult, frustrating or 
expensive.  Id.  
157See ConsumerReports.org, Consumer Reports Bottom Line Price, http://www.consumer 
reports.org/cro/cars/the-consumer-reports-bottom-line-price-405.html (last visited Jan. 21, 
2006). 
158See Carfax.com, http://www.carfax.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 
159See, e.g., Mike Hudson, Using a Car Broker to Buy Your Next Vehicle, http://www. 
edmunds.com/advice/buying/articles/103283/article.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 
160See, e.g., Carbuyingtips.com, How To Buy An Auto Extended Warranty, http://www. 
carbuyingtips.com/warranty.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 
161Importantly, consent is only a subset of the overall class of voluntary actions and 
choices that form every individual’s character and project that character to the world.  
Professor Jonathan Jacobs, for example, persuasively and elegantly develops the Aristotelian 
notion that individuals voluntarily develop their own characters through the exercise of 
personal choices and habituation of those choices, and thus bear responsibility for the 
manifestations of that character in the world.  See JONATHAN JACOBS, CHOOSING CHARACTER 
10-33 (2001).  Sartre similarly builds on this theme of choice and responsibility as voluntary 
manifestations of the self: 
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Thus, by consenting to a contract for a particular product—an automobile, 
refrigerator, mortgage, or a law school education—an individual consumer adopts 
and promotes a particular external picture of the self.162  If external forces impair the 
power to grant or withhold consent, such that a party is compelled to enter a 
particular contract or eschew another, in a sense that party no longer fully “owns” his 
self because he cannot exclusively control how that self operates or manifests to the 
world. The property interest in that manifestation of the self has been impaired. 
If the consent power is one manifestation of a property interest in self-identity, 
bargaining power represents the fence around it.  By analogy, a rancher may own 
both a parcel of real property and the length of barbed wire and fence posts around 
that parcel, but the proper use of one piece of property enhances and defines the 
other property.  Similarly, bargaining power comprises these separate inputs that 
may be property analogs in themselves, but their true value lies in maximizing the 
consent power they surround and protect. Thus, for example, an individual may 
invest tremendous labor, time, and money in obtaining a business education, or in 
developing decision-management software, or in hiring legal counsel to assist in 
business negotiations.  The individual “owns” those bargaining power inputs, but 
they have value primarily as means of protecting the individual’s power to grant or 
withhold consent in various transactions and contexts. 
Despite the availability of such discrete and identifiable bargaining power inputs, 
consumers display wide heterogeneity in the degree to which they take advantage of 
readily available tools that will maximize their ability to achieve a preferred outcome 
in the transaction.  As noted previously, even in situations involving homogenous 
commodities such as CDs and books, some, if not most, e-consumers regularly fail to 
perform price comparisons or shop at more than one site.163  Others routinely do so.  
Such heterogeneity is not surprising.  Parties often possess bargaining power that 
they fail to exercise.164  They may not be aware that they possess that power, may not 
know the results of exercising their power, may be restrained by obligations to third 
                                                           
The most terrible situations of war, the worst tortures do not create a non-human state 
of things; there is no non-human situation. . . . [I]n addition the situation is mine 
because it is the image of my free choice of myself, and everything which it presents 
to me is mine in that this represents me and symbolizes me.  
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMAN EMOTIONS 52-59 (Hazel E. Barnes, trans.) 
(1957). There are many other opportunities for development and expression of the self—
including consent or choice in the political, social, familial, and religious contexts. But while 
action in those contexts—our votes, friendships or enmities, support, and tithes—will 
advantage or disadvantage other actors in a relatively restricted and unmeasureable sense, our 
choices in the commercial context provide the most tempting targets for manipulation by 
everyone else who wants our money. 
162See Allen, supra note 53, at 751-57 (analyzing privacy as necessary context in which 
individuals develop moral autonomy necessary to participate through exercise of personal 
choices and in response to external obligations in the public sphere and emphasizing need for 
morally autonomous individuals to separate actions in public sphere from private sphere). 
163See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
164See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 171-72 (noting that parties may often possess sources 
of power that they do not exercise for various reasons, including ignorance, lack of willpower, 
external pressures from other parties, and hopes for maintaining good future relations between 
the parties). 
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parties, or may merely be unwilling to use that power.165  The important question in 
the consumer transaction context asks whether contract law should hold consumers 
responsible—by denying them access to protective doctrines such as 
unconscionability, undue influence, duress, avoidance for public policy, the parol 
evidence rule, the reasonable expectations doctrine, and interpretive rules like contra 
proferentum that are based upon bargaining power weaknesses—for their failure to 
take reasonable, low-cost steps to improve their bargaining power and protect their 
ability to withhold consent. If Mrs. Williams knew that Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co. would repossess all items financed under the add-on security clause, and she 
intelligently accepted the risk, should she be barred from claiming unconscionability 
under an inequality of bargaining power theory when she defaults on her loan 
payments?166  If a single Internet search would have shown this problem, did the 
consumer lack bargaining power, or just fail to access a cheap and readily available 
source? 
Contract law doctrines employing bargaining power do account for the role of 
personal responsibility to some extent.  The official comment to U.C.C. § 2-302, for 
example, explicitly provides that “[t]he principle [of unconscionability] is one of the 
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of 
risks because of superior bargaining power.”167  Reliance upon a misrepresentation or 
promise that the party knows to be false or unreliable will generally preclude claims 
of fraud or promissory estoppel arising from one party’s monopoly on truthful 
information.168  Likewise, although more relevant to questions of assent than issues 
                                                                
165See id. 
166This question is actually important and intriguing.  As Eben Colby observes in a well-
researched and documented historical analysis of the Williams backstory, the community 
serviced by Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. was probably generally aware that the company 
would repossess all financed items upon any default in payments.  See Colby, supra note 114, 
at 625 n.1, 652. As Colby notes, even rioters trashing the store in response to the assassination 
of Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. specifically called for looters to “Get the books!  Get the 
books!”  See id. at 625 n.1 (quoting William Raspberry, The Day the City’s Fury Was 
Unleashed: Lessons of the Riots, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1988, at A1). Likewise, while Mrs. 
Williams “testified that she did not understand the actual contracts . . . . Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Company had filed approximately one hundred writs of replevin each year for many 
years preceding Williams’s litigation and appears to have acquired a reputation for its 
actions.”  Id. at 652.  
While not sure about Ora Lee Williams in particular, an attorney that has represented 
the furniture company is of the opinion that many of the people in the neighborhood, 
and many customers of the store, were familiar with the repercussions of not making 
timely payments – specifically that the company would repossess all items sold to that 
customer. 
Id.   
167U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.  
168See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Parham, 693 So.2d 409, 421 (Ala. 1997) (holding party 
who was “fully capable of reading and understanding . . . documents, but nonetheless made a 
deliberate decision to ignore written contract terms” could not show reasonable reliance 
necessary to support claim of fraud); Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d 674, 676-77 (Mass. 1983) 
(rejecting, for lack of reasonable reliance, real property buyer’s claim of fraud against seller 
and real estate broker for failure to disclose seasonal water problem on site where buyer had 
notice of seasonal water issues and purchased property anyway); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
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of bargaining power disparities, court decisions relating to shrink-wrap and click-
wrap contracts have shown little sympathy to consumer claims that they were unable 
to learn about, read, print and understand the terms of these contracts.  In Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc.,169 for example, the Seventh Circuit’s affirmation of the 
enforceability of “money now—terms later” shrink wrap contracts in effect imposes 
responsibility on consumers to take the additional step of returning the purchased 
product to the producer in order to protect both their bargaining power and their 
power to withhold consent.170 
C.  Propertization of Bargaining Power at the Judicial Level of Analysis: The End of 
the Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine 
By creating the basis for a wide heterogeneity of individual bargaining power, 
information technology has potentially destroyed bargaining power as a legally 
meaningful concept in many consumer contexts.  Arguably, courts could continue 
employing the tired old proxies for negotiating strength—wealth, education, 
sophistication, gender, race, and so on—and just add “Internet access and 
sophistication” as one more item in the list.171  To the extent that approach deviates at 
all from traditional contract models for assessing bargaining strength, it will likely 
merely add additional factors to be considered in an already indeterminate and 
incoherent inquiry.   
The problem with that approach is that the propertization of bargaining power 
inputs is not just an exercise in identifying items for the list of attributes that 
                                                           
CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (stating that enforcement of promise under promissory estoppel theory 
may depend upon reasonableness of promissee’s reliance). 
169105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
170See id. at 1151; see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401-402 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (observing that user of online domain name registration information is bound by 
use restrictions of which it became aware after first request for registration information); 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that shrink wrap 
contract in which consumer has opportunity to review terms and reject if unacceptable is 
sufficient to create enforceable contract upon use of product); Caspi v. Microsoft Network 
LLC, 732 A.2d 528, 125 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999) (“The plaintiffs in this case were free to scroll 
through the various computer screens that presented the terms of their contracts before 
clicking their agreement.”); cf. In re RealNetworks, 2000 WL 631341, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 
(holding in context of “written agreement” requirement under Federal Arbitration Act that “the 
process of printing the License Agreement is no more difficult or esoteric than many other 
basic computer functions, and the melodrama and over exaggeration with which Intervenor 
describes the alleged impossibility of printing the License Agreement is disingenuous”). 
171Many commentators have worried, for instance, that the “digital divide” will create a 
new social class division between those with Internet access and those without. See, e.g., 
Patricia M. Worthy, Racial Minorities and the Quest to Narrow the Digital Divide: Redefining 
the Concept of “Universal Service,” 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 39-48 (2003) 
(“[T]oday’s digital environment has evolved to the point that a ‘digital divide’ between 
distinct groups of Americans is at risk of becoming a form of ‘information apartheid’ . . . 
based on income, . . . race, and geography. . . .”); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Silicon Ceilings: 
Information Technology Equity, the Digital Divide and the Gender Gap Among Information 
Technology Professionals, 2 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 2, 2-4 (2003) (noting that while 
“women use the Internet in greater numbers than men, the number of women who are 
information technology professionals . . . lags far behind that of men”). 
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typically give rise to power in most relationships.  Instead, by looking at bargaining 
power as comprising discrete, identifiable, valuable and “ownable” inputs, which in 
turn act to fence or guard the individual self’s ability to fend off unwanted 
approaches, we move from a gross weighing of crudely-recognized limits on the 
individual’s power to the much more interesting question of what an individual could 
do to improve her situation.  Many of the traditional considerations are relatively 
immutable—an individual generally does not quickly become sophisticated, 
educated, wealthy or poor, or change races or genders easily.172  But the Internet 
changes everything.  With low information and transaction costs, the Internet and 
accompanying information technology creates the potential for consumers to identify 
additional bargaining power inputs and to acquire them cheaply, quickly and easily. 
Power, at least in social situations, is generally about the potential, not the actual, 
and that is the question that the Internet throws squarely in the face of the contract 
model for measuring relative bargaining strength.  What if Mrs. Williams had a 
friend over when the Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. rep knocked on her door?  How 
about a competitor’s catalog showing substantially better terms and promising “we 
won’t repo your whole house for one missed payment”?  A quick reference guide 
discussing the pros and cons of add-on security clauses?  A lawyer sitting quietly on 
the kitchen stool? Each of these possibilities is a hammer blow to her claims of 
bargaining weakness and at a certain point we just lose sympathy.  Instead, we ask 
“what did Mrs. Williams know and when did she know it?” 
As power becomes commodified and propertized, discrete and identifiable, 
marketable and marketed, the onus should shift to the allegedly weak parties to 
justify why they did not take reasonable steps to improve their bargaining position. A 
friend of mine recently got a great bargain on his vehicle insurance from an 
insurance provider that eventually denied his claim when the vehicle caught fire.  
Afterward, he discovered that his Secretary of State’s website prominently listed that 
insurer as having engaged in numerous deceptive trade practices and bad faith claim 
denials.  A simple Google search would have revealed significant problems.  While 
the insurer may have violated state insurance regulations and potentially committed 
fraud or other deceptive trade practices, it seems unreasonable to assert inequality of 
bargaining power as a justification for an unconscionability claim in that case 
because the insured could have found other providers and could have known the 
reputational issues surrounding the “great” price on watercraft insurance. 
Tempting as such ideas are from an individual responsibility and strong personal 
autonomy point of view, the most likely outcome of these scenarios is not a 
refinement of traditional approaches to assessing bargaining power.  Instead, in the 
context of individual cases, the propertization of bargaining power and consent 
power illustrates the absurdity of attempts to impose legal consequences based upon 
relative bargaining power.  
First, the Internet creates as many power issues as it resolves.  The same 
technological developments that permit consumers to drive better bargains may also 
generate new sources of bargaining power disparities, as with the digital divide 
                                                                
172Of course, other factors often employed by courts to weigh relative bargaining power 
may change quickly, including availability of meaningful alternatives, necessity, and 
opportunity to negotiate. See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 213-15 (analyzing relationship 
between individual characteristics such as wealth or sophistication and transactional 
characteristics such as availability of meaningful alternatives or necessity). 
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phenomenon173 and Seth Godin’s second divide between the digiterati and the 
technological herd.174  No matter how many new sources of bargaining power the 
information era creates for producers and consumers, there are always additional, 
unknown and perhaps unknowable sources of power outside of what we can see, and 
those sources will be outcome determinative. 
Second, the easy availability of potential sources of power may finally destroy 
inequality of bargaining power as a legally meaningful construct in individual cases.  
Analogous to Radin’s suggestion that the strongly adhesive nature of Internet-based 
contracting may finally change lay perceptions that contracts are worthy of 
enforcement because they are “bargained for” or “agreed to,”175 the ability of a 
consumer to make reasonable, cheap, and quick improvements in their bargaining 
position may erode perceptions of power as a static phenomenon.  The availability of 
so many reasonable and affordable means for consumers to increase their bargaining 
power strongly suggests that if courts insist on assessing the parties’ relative 
bargaining power then the parties should be responsible for their decisions not to 
make reasonable investments in developing their positions.  If it is widely-known 
that many consumers improve their bargaining strength, then that potential becomes 
at least as important to the analysis of relative strength as the parties’ actual power. 
While we may fool ourselves into thinking that we can figure out the actual balance 
of power between contracting parties, it seems unlikely that any court could sit 
through arguments relating to the potentially infinite array of things the weaker party 
could have done to get a better deal. 
D.  Propertization of Bargaining Power Inputs Informs Legislative-style 
Decisionmaking Regarding State Intervention into Private Contracts 
On the macro level, treating bargaining power as an analog to property may be 
useful for grounding normative judgments that a particular class of transactions 
should be moved closer in or further out from “core” contract doctrine.176  The 
problem with the bargaining power justification for defining where along the 
continuum between pure private autonomy and pure public orderings a particular 
transaction type belongs is that those placements are based upon systemic 
assessments of the relative bargaining power of the parties. Where those bargaining 
power assessments are legally cognizable—that is where legal decision makers can 
consistently repeat those assessments across similar transaction types and where 
                                                                
173See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
174See Godin, supra note 35 (describing “new” digital divide between technologically 
savvy “digiterati” and the rest of us who are merely content to adopt new technologies after 
they enter the mainstream). 
175See Radin, Online Standardization, supra note 21, at 1140 (noting that while lay people 
tend to “conceive of contract as dickered consent between two people,” an online contracting 
environment will erode that conception). 
176See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (using examples of National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935 and charitable subscriptions law to illustrate situations in which courts 
and legislatures have moved transaction types closer to or further from the “core” of common 
law contract). 
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observers accept those assessments as credible—they justify decisions on the degree 
of regulation appropriate for a particular transaction type.177 
Where the initial determinations do not reflect the parties’ actual power 
relationship or changing circumstances over time alter traditionally accepted power 
assessments, the decision to move the transaction closer in or further from core 
contract doctrine becomes insupportable.  Thus, while the traditional assessment of 
the bargaining power relationship between strong insurers and weak insureds178 
likely was correct when made, the information era has undoubtedly increased the 
bargaining power of insureds who can now easily compare coverage, prices, claim 
denial rates, firm reputation, and sanctions or warnings issued by state regulators, 
and in many cases, fine tune their insurance requirements to a greater degree than 
was possible in the pre-information era.  Admittedly, insureds have never, and likely 
never will, have greater bargaining power than insurers,179 but it is also true that the 
traditional picture of the completely helpless insurance consumer no longer makes 
sense. 
Treating bargaining power as comprising a body of discrete potential inputs in 
the information era, however, may partly resolve this problem.  The property model 
of bargaining power creates a more finely-grained picture of bargaining power by 
identifying additional discrete sources of bargaining power and the potential value of 
additional investments in developing those sources.  Traditionally acknowledged 
sources of power such as wealth, education, and business sophistication remain 
relevant to power assessments, but the availability of additional discrete inputs such 
as price and warranty shopping, information on producer reputation and others 
necessarily changes the nature of such inquiries.  But the bargaining power story of 
oppressed consumers makes sense only where the consumers cannot take reasonable 
steps to improve their situation.  The proper analysis in the information era is not 
whether consumers, women, ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, the poor, the 
uneducated, the needy, buyers in monopolized markets, and so on lack bargaining 
power or lack meaningful alternatives.  Rather, the question should focus on how 
much bargaining power they have or could have across different categories of 
transaction types.  In refocusing the inquiry toward a more dynamic and complex 
bargaining power analysis, the propertization model potentially promotes more 
accurate (or at least more credible) initial assessments of typical power relationships 
and a justification for state responses to changed circumstances.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Internet and its accompanying host of information technologies have created 
a different kind of power relationship between producers and consumers.  Many 
aspects of that relationship appear unchanged from traditional models.  Producers 
still have near-complete superiority in information about their products, still know 
their markets, and still generally control the terms of their contracts with consumers.  
                                                                
177See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
178See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (analyzing insurer bargaining power over 
insureds in most cases). 
179Cf. SLAWSON, supra note 4, at 25 (“[A] producer almost invariably possesses substantial 
bargaining power over its own products in an absolute sense. It would not stay in business 
long if it did not.”). 
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Consumers still fail to read and understand their form contracts, still blithely give 
away valuable information and rights, and still cannot bargain in any meaningful 
way over their contract terms.  
But other aspects of that relationship are radically different.  In addition to their 
past advantages, producers now possess an Orwellian database of information about 
their consumers and can invade their customers’ lives with sophisticated and targeted 
marketing designed to increase the likelihood that an individual consumer will 
succumb to their blandishments.  Although they largely have lost control over their 
own information and have even less ability to bargain over the terms of their 
contracts, consumers, likewise, have dramatically expanded their bargaining power 
through information-gathering capabilities, an ability to monitor producer reputation 
and quality, and the capacity to strike back at underperforming producers.  
On the one hand, these new sources and forms of power merely complicate the 
job of courts attempting to assess the parties’ bargaining power for purposes of 
determining a contract’s enforceability under unconscionability, public policy, 
reasonable expectations, duress, fraud, undue influence, and other doctrines based 
upon explicit or implicit weighing of that relationship.  Courts will likely continue to 
attempt to apply the inequality of bargaining power doctrine to individual cases and 
will continue to generate incoherent and indeterminate results.  Perhaps, if we are 
lucky, the Internet may provide the basis for determining that power relations are so 
complex, so dynamic, so subject to the widely-varying activities of different 
consumers at different times that we will finally abandon the doctrine in individual 
cases.  I’m not holding my breath. 
But the neat thing about the Internet is that it makes everything “macro” – data is 
the breath of the Internet and the blood of the information economy, and it is in the 
nature of the beast to collect, collate process, and report this data.  Since at least the 
first third of the twentieth century, courts and legislatures have been shifting discrete 
transaction types into and out of the core of contract law.  In some cases, those 
movements have reflected underlying systemic power relations, some well and some 
not so well.  The metaphor of bargaining power as a property right provides a unique 
opportunity to reconceptualize that contract-based bargaining power heuristic that 
has justified legislative-style movements such as insurance, banking and consumer 
law.  With a property-based approach to bargaining power, we potentially gain a 
mechanism that addresses the discrete inputs available for each side to protect itself 
and that can better assess the relative costs and benefits of current and future 
legislative interferences with consumer contracts. 
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